Background: Since the declaration of the 10th Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in DRC on 1st Aug 2018, several neighboring countries have been developing and implementing preparedness efforts to prevent EVD cross-border transmission to enable timely detection, investigation, and response in the event of a confirmed EVD outbreak in the country. We describe Uganda's experience in EVD preparedness.

Introduction In October 2017, a blood sample from a resident of Kween District, Eastern Uganda, tested positive for Marburg virus. Within 24 hour of confirmation, a rapid outbreak response was initiated. Here, we present results of epidemiological and laboratory investigations. Methods A district task force was activated consisting of specialised teams to conduct case finding, case management and isolation, contact listing and follow up, sample collection and testing, and community engagement. An ecological investigation was also carried out to identify the potential source of infection. Virus isolation and Next Generation sequencing were performed to identify the strain of Marburg virus. Results Seventy individuals (34 MVD suspected cases and 36 close contacts of confirmed cases) were epidemiologically investigated, with blood samples tested for MVD. Only four cases met the MVD case definition; one was categorized as a probable case while the other three were confirmed cases. A total of 299 contacts were identified; during follow- up, two were confirmed as MVD. Of the four confirmed and probable MVD cases, three died, yielding a case fatality rate of 75%. All four cases belonged to a single family and 50% (2/4) of the MVD cases were female. All confirmed cases had clinical symptoms of fever, vomiting, abdominal pain and bleeding from body orifices. Viral sequences indicated that the Marburg virus strain responsible for this outbreak was closely related to virus strains previously shown to be circulating in Uganda. Conclusion This outbreak of MVD occurred as a family cluster with no additional transmission outside of the four related cases. Rapid case detection, prompt laboratory testing at the Uganda National VHF Reference Laboratory and presence of pre-trained, well-prepared national and district rapid response teams facilitated the containment and control of this outbreak within one month, preventing nationwide and global transmission of the disease.

Objective To demonstrate the feasibility of integrated screening for cryptococcal antigenemia and tuberculosis (TB) prior to antiretroviral therapy (ART) initiation and to assess disease specific and all-cause mortality in the first 6 months of follow-up. Methods We enrolled a cohort of HIV-infected, ART-naïve adults with CD4 counts ≤ 250 cells/µL in rural Uganda who were followed for 6 months after ART initiation. All subjects underwent screening for TB; those with CD4 ≤ 100 cells/µL also had cryptococcal antigen (CrAg) screening. For those who screened positive, standard treatment for TB or preemptive treatment for cryptococcal infection was initiated, followed by ART two weeks later. Results Of 540 participants enrolled, pre-ART screening detected 10.6% (57/540) with prevalent TB and 6.8% (12/177 with CD4 count ≤ 100 cells/µL) with positive serum CrAg. After ART initiation, 13 (2.4%) patients were diagnosed with TB and one patient developed cryptococcal meningitis. Overall 7.2% of participants died (incidence rate 15.6 per 100 person years at risk). Death rates were significantly higher among subjects with TB and cryptococcal antigenemia compared to subjects without these diagnoses. In multivariate analysis, significant risk factors for mortality were male sex, baseline anemia of hemoglobin ≤ 10 mg/dL, wasting defined as body mass index ≤ 15.5 kg/m2, and opportunistic infections (TB, positive serum CrAg). Conclusion Pre-ART screening for opportunistic infections detects many prevalent cases of TB and cryptococcal infection. However, severely immunosuppressed and symptomatic HIV patients continue to experience high mortality after ART initiation.

Across Borders field events in Kanungu and Kisoro districts-Uganda, March 2019 Date Type (no. of participants) District Target group Event location Mar 15 Key informant interview (1) Kisoro Border screening volunteer Nteko, unofficial POE Mar 18 Focus group discussion (8) Kisoro Transport personnel (motorcycle taxi drivers) Bunagana, official POE Mar 18 Key informant interview (1) Kisoro Security personnel Bunagana, official POE Mar 19 Key informant interview (1) Kisoro Health care worker Nyakabande refugee transit camp Mar 19 Focus group discussion (4) Kisoro Health care workers Kisoro Hospital Mar 20 Key informant interview (1) Kanungu Security personnel Kanungu district health office Mar 21 Key informant interview (1) Kanungu District health personnel Kanungu district health office Mar 21 Focus group discussion (10) Kanungu Community leaders Butogota (also called Kyeshero), official POE Mar 22 Focus group discussion (8) Kanungu Traders Ishasha, official POE Mar 23 Focus group discussion (8) Kanungu Health care workers Bwindi Community Hospital Mar 25 Focus group discussion (8) Kanungu Military personnel at the border point Kayonza Tea Factory Mar 25 Key informant interview (1) Kanungu Health care worker Matanda refugee transit center Abbreviation: POE = point of entry.

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