Tens of millions of people are currently choosing health coverage on a state or federal health insurance exchange as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. We examine how well people make these choices, how well they think they do, and what can be done to improve these choices. We conducted 6 experiments asking people to choose the most cost-effective policy using websites modeled on current exchanges. Our results suggest there is significant room for improvement. Without interventions, respondents perform at near chance levels and show a significant bias, overweighting out-of-pocket expenses and deductibles. Financial incentives do not improve performance, and decision-makers do not realize that they are performing poorly. However, performance can be improved quite markedly by providing calculation aids, and by choosing a “smart” default. Implementing these psychologically based principles could save purchasers of policies and taxpayers approximately 10 billion dollars every year.

Tens of millions of people are currently choosing health coverage on a state or federal health insurance exchange as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. We examine how well people make these choices, how well they think they do, and what can be done to improve these choices. We conducted 6 experiments asking people to choose the most costeffective policy using websites modeled on current exchanges. Our results suggest there is significant room for improvement. Without interventions, respondents perform at near chance levels and show a significant bias, overweighting out-of-pocket expenses and deductibles. Financial incentives do not improve performance, and decision-makers do not realize that they are performing poorly. However, performance can be improved quite markedly by providing calculation aids, and by choosing a ''smart'' default. Implementing these psychologically based principles could save purchasers of policies and taxpayers approximately 10 billion dollars every year.

We investigated how judgments of political messengers depend upon what would benefit one's preferred candidate. In Study 1a, participants were asked to evaluate the warmth and competence of the writer of a pro- or anti-Obama political message for the 2012 presidential election (Obama/warm; Romney/competent). When judging the messages, warmth was emphasized by Democrats and competence by Republicans. Study 1b replicated these effects for messages about Romney as well. Study 2 examined the 2004 presidential election where perceptions of the party candidates' warmth and competence reversed (Bush/warm; Kerry/competent). There competence was emphasized by Democrats and warmth by Republicans. Study 3 showed that varying the warmth and competence of each party's prospective candidates for the 2016 election influences whether warmth or competence is emphasized by Democrats or Republicans. Thus, differences between Republicans and Democrats in emphasizing warmth or competence reflect a dynamic motivated cognition that is tailored to benefit their preferred candidate.

Moral psychology is used to explore the interaction between regulatory mode (locomotion; assessment) and diurnal preference (“early birds”; “night owls”). Moral and immoral behavior was partly explained by an interaction between regulatory mode and the time of day the task took place. In Studies 1a and 1b, we established a relation between self-reported diurnal preference and regulatory mode using both a chronic measure and an induction: stronger locomotion preferring an earlier time of day; stronger assessment preferring a later time of day. In Study 2, we show that those with a locomotion predominance were less likely to invest in a public good later in the day compared to those with an assessment predominance. Lastly, in Study 3, those induced into an assessment mode were more likely to cheat when randomly assigned to complete a task in the morning compared to those induced into a locomotion mode.

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