Intensity standards have gained substantial momentum as a regulatory instrument in US climate policy. Energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries are traditionally opposed to initiatives for domestic carbon pricing as they are particularly vulnerable to competitiveness losses and refer to counterproductive emission leakage in a unilateral climate policy context. This has led to policy proposals where intensity standards on energy and carbon might at least in part substitute for explicit carbon pricing via taxes or emission allowances. In this paper we study the economic efficiency properties of intensity standards as an instrument of unilateral climate policy. We first develop a theoretical partial equilibrium framework and show that standards can have an ambiguous effect on carbon leakage. We then use an applied computable general equilibrium model of the global economy to gain quantitative insights into the effects of intensity standards for the case of the US. Our numerical results show that intensity standards may rather increase than decrease carbon leakage. Moreover, standards can lead to considerable welfare losses compared to uniform emission taxing. The tradability of standards across industries is a mechanism that can reduce these negative effects.

Abstract.This paper examines the various tests commonly used to select random parameters in choice modelling. The most common procedures for selecting random parameters are: the Lagrange Multiplier test as proposed by McFadden and Train (2000), the t-statistic of the deviation of the random parameter and the log-likelihood ratio test. The identification of random parameters in other words the recognition of preference heterogeneity among population is based on the fact that an individual makes a choice depending on her/his: tastes, perceptions and experiences. A simulation experiment was carried out based on a real choice experiment and the results indicated that the power of these three tests depends importantly on the spread and type of the tested parameter distribution.

Informational failures frequently lead consumers to make non-optimal energy-efficient purchasing decisions. Energy efficiency labels seek to influence consumer behaviour at the point of sale by reducing informational failures regarding energy efficiency. However, several informational and behavioural factors contribute to the energy efficiency gap and could render label-oriented policies useless. The purchasing decision model of Allcott and Greenstone (The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26, 3–28, 2012) is used here to explore the different factors that influence purchasing decisions and understand (i) the importance of energy consumption compared to other attributes; (ii) how consumers weight energy savings and (iii) what other benefits and costs influence the purchase of energy-efficient goods. The analysis reported here is based on qualitative research methods and is conducted in the household and service sectors (the accommodation sector and private service companies), for appliances, heating and cooling systems and cars in Spain. Results show that (i) there is still an informational gap regarding energy labels and (ii) bounded rationality and end-user behaviour are important limiting factors for the purchase of energy-efficient goods in Spain.

The household sector is one of the most energy-intensive sectors in Europe, and thus a focal point for reducing greenhouse gas emissions associated with energy consumption. Energy efficiency is considered a key measure to reduce household energy consumption, but several factors could lead to an underinvestment in energy efficiency. This is the so-called energy efficiency gap or paradox. The factors in question are grouped under market failures (including informational failures), behavioural failures and other factors. Various policies can be used to address these failures and promote the adoption of energy-efficient technologies, including energy standards and codes, economic incentives and information instruments. This paper reviews the empirical evidence to date on energy efficiency policies and discusses their effectiveness. On the one hand, command and control instruments seem to be effective policies, but they have to overcome several barriers. In the case of price instruments, subsidies and taxes do not seem to be effective while rebates present mixed results as they sometimes are effective and in other cases, they could present significant shortcomings. Finally, the effectiveness of informational policies is not always ensured as they depend on the country, sector and product category. Information feedback tools also seem to be effective as they work as a constant reminder of energy-efficient behaviour. Some limitations of energy efficiency policies are also identified, such as the difficulties of implementing codes and standards given that a minimum level need to be achieved, differences in the effectiveness of rebate programmes and non-conclusive results in regard to the effectiveness of monetary energy efficiency labels. Keywords separated by ' -' Energy Efficiency gap -Energy Efficiency Policies -Effectiveness of policies Foot note informationSpringer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.