The edia has e e tl gi e u h atte tio of the stealthi g t e d; u dis losed o do removal during sex, and how this may affect consent to sexual activity. This paper seeks to discuss where situations like this sit within the Sexual Offenses Act 2003, and how it may compare to other instances of consent gained in deceitful circumstances.

No abstract

Sexual offences in England and Wales have had a dramatic reimagining in the last 15 years, with the Sexual Offences Act 2003 establishing not only the boundaries of the most heinous of offences such as rape, but also defining one of the most important elements; consent. This article seeks to explore the problems that surround establishing if legally valid consent has been given, with particular regard for cases where voluntary intoxication takes centre stage. The problem that often arises is the question on whether or not an intoxicated victim had the capacity to consent, or establishing if she did consent when memory of the event is hazy, possibly from both parties. Using comparative analysis with other jurisdictions and their take on the offence of rape, the author seeks to discover if the current rules are sufficient to fit within twenty-first century western culture. The victim will be referred to as 'she', although the law here and all situations discussed are equally applicable to male rape.

The difficulty with accusations of rape when a victim is voluntarily intoxicated has long prevailed in the courtroom. How and where to draw the line of being legally capable to consent has been debated in several cases and by many academics. This article will discuss this dilemma and how it may be solved.

The provisions of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 have been no stranger to scrutiny since enactment in regard to the partial defences to murder, but none more so than the sexual infidelity exclusion that somehow appeared sitting neatly within s. 55(6)(c). The exclusion means that when considering if the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, one must disregard things done or said which constituted sexual infidelity. This must have come as quite a surprise to the Law Commission, as its report preceding this change to the law eventually formulated by the government did not mention an exclusion of this kind, and it does not appear to be a welcomed change. Of course, the reasoning underpinning such a bold move is sound; a sole confession of sexual infidelity and subsequent killing from anger and jealousy should not partially excuse such actions. The problem is that such circumstances are rare. In most cases involving an admission of sexual infidelity, there is often much more to the situation than meets the eye. This comment considers the repercussions of having this exclusion included in the 2009 Act and how it will actually affect both genders, not just jealous men. Why this particular exclusion?Hansard is a good place to start as to how and why this exclusion came to be:We are not trying to legislate away people's natural and normal upset, concern and anger about these circumstances, but we do not accept that that itself ought to lead to reducing a murder finding. 1