No abstract

The objective of this paper is to provide a view on the problem of insufficient state protection of critical infrastructure throughout the Covid-19 crisis. The paper looks at this problem with regard to the definition of critical infrastructure, its content, and also the limitations of current approaches to critical infrastructure protection. The examples relating to the Covid-19 crisis show the practices adopted and suggest possible steps forward. The research methodology implemented in this research is based on a critical analysis of the existing literature. The themes described in this paper show there is an urgent need to change current critical infrastructure protection approaches to a resilience-based modus operandi. Specifically, this paper highlights the need to shift the understanding of critical infrastructure from an object-oriented approach towards essential services/functions and to highlight its complex, socio- technical nature. It also highlights the deficiencies of current, prevention-based approaches to critical infrastructure protection such as the insufficient focus on identification and management process of vulnerabilities, especially in relation to (inter)dependencies resulting from interconnections with other systems. The gravity of the situation caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, despite its negative connotations, can be used as an opportunity to examine the real condition of protection of critical infrastructure. The pandemic suggests that there is much left to be done and because of the unpredictability of the future, we need to start acting as soon as possible.

<p>Critical infrastructure is a complex system that provide essential services to the society such as food, water, energy, transportation, health, financial services. Any potential dysfunction of Critical Infrastructure might result in severe consequences for the human life, the environment, the economy and the security of the country. The recently experienced repercussions of COVID-19 pandemic exposed major deficiencies in terms of protection of Critical Infrastructure. The implemented approaches focusing on the threat identification and prevention strategies, without efficient organisational resilience, proved to be ineffective, especially in case of unanticipated or low-probability threats. The biological threats, such as pandemics, are relatively rare and difficult to estimate and prevent. They affect the whole organisation and contrary to the most of the natural hazards, such as floods, fires or hurricanes, have constant, permanent character. The COVID-19 pandemic forced Critical Infrastructure operators to operate in crisis mode as a result of shortages of staff, disruption of supply chains and increased vulnerability to cyber-attacks. The occurrence of these consequences unveiled the underlying vulnerabilities of Critical infrastructure. Namely, the lack of capabilities to successfully detect the possible threats resulting from dependencies and interdependencies and vulnerabilities related to internal procedures, plans or capabilities to respond and recover after the adverse event. The protection of Critical Infrastructure based on identification and assessment of vulnerabilities would enable Critical Infrastructure operators to apply adequate measures tailored to address the causes of identified vulnerabilities, to prioritise actions and to concentrate resources on the most pressing issues. The understanding of vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure to biological threats, would help Critical Infrastructure operators to prepare better for future “black swan” events and cascading disruptions across sectoral boundaries. The elimination or reduction of vulnerabilities would make Critical Infrastructure more resilient to future crisis situations and would ensure the undisturbed continuity of the essential services.</p>