Politics is a bane of administrative systems such as performance appraisals. It not only debilitates the system's credibility in the eyes of various stakeholders, but also adversely affects the employees' morale and the organizational effectiveness. While admitting that rooting it out completely is impossible, it is in the organizational interest that it is mitigated to a large extent. In case of performance appraisals, assessees and assessors, both try to influence the assessees� performance rating to advance self-interests. The former typically aims at higher ratings/rewards, and uses informal influence means such as upward connections, ingratiation, etc., to achieve it. The latter may use appraisals to fulfil their vested interests like building in�groups by rewarding certain favoured assessees, and projecting good departmental performance, by manipulating assessees� ratings (inflation or deflation). Some managers consider these actions legitimate because it helps them manage effectively. While these manipulations may fulfil the assessors' short-term goals, it hurts the organization in the long run by compromising performance culture, demoralizing genuine performers, discrediting pay for performance policies, etc. This paper focuses on the assessors' perspective and conceptualizes their perceptions of politics in appraisals (PAPS). We argue that PAPS constitutes the assessors' perception about political behaviours of other stakeholders�reviewers, assessees, and fellow appraisers�and shapes their own perceptions. These perceptions will be influenced by certain contextual factors in which appraisals are conducted. We have focused on four such factors: ambiguity about policies, procedures, performance standards, criteria, etc. assessors' accountability with respect to appraisals assessors' and assessees' instrumentality linked to appraisal organizational support in terms of assessors� training to conduct better appraisals. We argue that these are key variables closely related to many job and organizational characteristics, and thus are fair representation of the appraisal context. In relation to these antecedents, we propose that these reduce assessors� PAPS when: Appraisal process and system ambiguity is low. The assessors are accountable to a neutral authority for following appraisal procedures which enhance rating accuracy; on the other hand, assessors' outcome accountability accentuates politicking. Some of the procedures which enhance accuracy are frequent feedback, 360-degree feedback, assessees' involvement in the process, etc. The assessors are trained to conduct fair appraisals. The assessors' and the assessees' appraisal instrumentality directly affects PAPS as well as moderates the above relations. It is further proposed that PAPS predict the assessors' intentions to pursue certain appraisal goals. It can be rating accuracy if political perceptions are low; and, it can be other political goals, if these perceptions are high. These intentions predict actual assessor actions. This paper contributes to appraisal literature and informs managers about mitigating appraisal politics.
