Background. We suggest and examine a behavioral approach to increasing seasonal influenza vaccine uptake. Our idea combines behavioral effects generated by a dominated option, together with more traditional tools, such as providing information and recommendations. Methods. Making use of the seasonal nature of the flu, our treatments present participants with 2 options to receive the shot: early in the season, which is recommended and hence “attractive,” or later. Three additional layers are examined: 1) mentioning that the vaccine is more likely to run out of stock late in the season, 2) the early shot is free while the late one costs a fee, and 3) the early shot carries a monetary benefit. We compare vaccination intentions in these treatments to those of a control group who were invited to receive the shot regardless of timing. Results. Using a sample of the Israeli adult population ( n = 3271), we found positive effects of all treatments on vaccination intentions, and these effects were significant for 3 of the 4 treatments. In addition, the vast majority of those who are willing to vaccinate intend to get the early shot. Conclusions. Introducing 2 options to get vaccinated against influenza (early or late) positively affects intentions to receive the flu shot. In addition, this approach nudges participants to take the shot in early winter, a timing that has been shown to be more cost-effective.

We develop a model in the presence of categories that creates a link between the agent’s exogenous endowment and an endogenous reference point. The reference point is the best feasible alternative in the endowment’s category. This reference generates a constraint set from which the final choice is made according to utility maximisation. The model predicts category bias, which generalises the status quo bias by attracting the agent to her endowment’s category but not necessarily to the endowment itself. We show that it accommodates recent experimental findings regarding the presence and absence of status quo bias in the realm of uncertainty. In a stylised financial setup, we show that it may lead to a risk premium even with risk-neutral agents.

We use the revealed preference method to derive a model of dynamic choice where the agent's past experience may influence her current decisions. Our model generalizes the classical individual choice model which is rationalized by utility maximization, and reduces to that model in the absence of experience. As the agent gains experience her utility changes but only in a very restricted fashion. Every period, after an alternative is chosen, the utility of that, and only that alternative, may change while the utility of all other alternatives remains fixed. The model provides a platform on which many behavioral dynamic phenomena may be examined. We utilize it and look into the behavioral implications of bounded memory, status quo bias and variety seeking.

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