In this paper we use an extreme point approach to analyze some usual decision criteria for multiple attribute decision‐making problems when partial information about the importance of the attributes is available. The obtained results show that the decision criteria to be chosen depend not only on the rationality principles, but also on the structure of the information set. We apply the obtained criteria to problems where the set of actions to be evaluated are either in qualitative and/or quantitative scales.

This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and, therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach allows the incorporation of partial information about the preferences of the agents into the model, and permits the identification of the set of equilibria in accordance with this information. We also propose an additional conservative criterion which can be applied in this framework in order to predict the results of interaction.The potential application of the theoretical results is shown with an analysis of a mixed oligopoly in which the agents value additional objectives other than their own benefit. These objectives are related to social welfare and to the profit of the industry. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework for the analysis of a wide range of strategic economic models.

No abstract

We consider an extension of the classic division problem with claims, division problems with multiple references. We show that the theory of cooperative games is able to provide a single-valued allocation rule for this class of problems. Moreover, this rule can be related with the Talmud rule for the classic division problem, as in Aumann and Maschler (J. Econ. Theory 36, 195-213, 1985). Finally, we establish the consistency and other basic properties of the rule.

No abstract