The existing literature explains the wavering course of President Barack Obama's policy on the 2001–03 Egyptian crisis as attributed to either his personal characteristics (lack of an international experience, predisposition to sermonize rather than to strategize) or to the impact of the decline of the United States as a global superpower (inability to influence foreign actors and contexts). Although both explanations are worthy of consideration, this article seeks to demonstrate that they are insufficient when accounting for the uncertainties shown by the United States during the Egyptian crisis. Domestic factors, particularly the internally divided US political elite and a foreign policy team with different views, played a crucial intervening role in defining the features of US foreign policy. It was domestic politics that made the Obama administration ineffective in dealing with the new scenario that emerged in the Middle East and in Egypt in particular.

This article comparatively analyzes the origins of the military doctrines in Israel and Iran, which are positioned at the poles of status quo and revisionism in the Middle East. In a conceptual hybridity, both parties stand strategically on the defensive but operationally combine defensive with offensive elements. These combinations are backed by powerful cultural motivations and organizational interests in each country. The implications enrich our understanding of the nature of military doctrine and indicate another contributing factor in regional destabilization.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has perceived the Egyptian

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