Does fairness matter in the hard bargaining and horse-trading that is associated with trade negotiations? This paper presents a positivist analysis of the particular concepts of fairness that developing countries have appealed to in their trade negotiations within the auspices of the GATT and WTO, how these notions have evolved, and the impact that they have had on negotiated outcomes. Treating the concept of fairness as my central dependent variable, I argue that the notion of fairness can only be understood in terms of the institutional context it is embedded in, which includes institutional structure as well as the participatory processes that underlie it. I advance three hypotheses on the relationship between institutional context: the fairness discourse, and the influence and manoeuvre that member countries can have in shaping that discourse. Focusing on the role of fairness in the negotiation positions of developing countries, I explain its substance and evolution through learning and adaptation by these countries within the very particular institutions of the GATT and the WTO, and the coalitions they form a part of and interact within. Copyright 2006 The Author Journal compilation 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. .

Over the past two decades the functions of international economic institutions have greatly expanded to include programmes and policies which affect a wider range of people, groups, and organisations than before. Where previously people could hold their national governments to account for such policies, they must now look to international institutions where the decisions are being made. But to whom are these institutions accountable and are they accountable to those whom they directly affect? This paper sets out to answer that question in respect of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. After analysing the new intrusiveness of the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, we explore how the concept of accountability might best be applied to international economic institutions. The paper then outlines the specific ways in which the IMF, World Bank, and WTO have recently bolstered their accountability through enhanced transparency and monitoring. In conclusion, however, the paper argues that in spite of improvements in accountability, the international economic institutions have not gone far enough in reforming their governance structures. There is a remaining imbalance between what they do, and their legitimacy as perceived by those they affect.

In large measure, the voice that developing countries were able to exercise in Cancun was a result of their effective coalition formation. In this paper we present a brief overview of the various coalitions that played an important role at Cancun. The greater part of this paper focuses on one among these various coalitions: the G20 on agriculture. The G20 presents an especially fascinating case of a coalition that combined a great diversity of members and apparently incompatible interests. All theoretical reasoning and historical precedent predicted that the group would collapse in the endgame. And yet the group survived. We investigate the sources of the unity of this group and trace them to a process of learning that allowed the group to acquire certain structural features and develop strategies that helped to cement it further. While our central dependent variable is the cohesion of the G20, we also address the derivative question of the costs and benefits of maintaining such coalitions. The Cancun coalitions give us an excellent case of coalitions that managed to retain their cohesion, but also ended up with a situation of no agreement rather than a fulfilment of even some of their demands. We examine some of the causes behind the impasse in the negotiation process and suggest ways in which future outcomes could be improved.

India is finally on the rise. It is increasingly recognized as an ‘emerging power’ and a ‘pivotal state’, and receives invitations to the major fora for international negotiations (such as the G8, or small group consultations within the WTO) that are commensurate with this recognition. Interesting, however, belying all predictions and often at considerable cost to itself, even the rising India continues to adhere to features of its old, Third Worldist, defensive style of diplomacy. This article examines the reasons why Indian negotiators show such willingness to ‘Just Say No’ across international negotiations. It focuses on India's negotiation strategies in the regimes of trade and nuclear non‐proliferation. The article argues that the sources of India's nay‐saying have deeper roots than accounts of bureaucratic politics and domestic interest groups would suggest. It also analyzes some recent changes in India's negotiating positions, and argues that it is still too early to speculate on how meaningful or longlasting these changes might be. Finally, the article identifies the conditions under which India's negotiating strategies might change from its traditional nay‐saying to a more proactive and easier engagement with the developed world.