We explore the minimal conditions for sustainable cooperation on a spatially distributed population of memoryless, unconditional strategies (cooperators and defectors) in presence of unbiased, non contingent mobility in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. We find that cooperative behavior is not only possible but may even be enhanced by such an "always-move" rule, when compared with the strongly viscous ("never-move") case. In addition, mobility also increases the capability of cooperation to emerge and invade a population of defectors, what may have a fundamental role in the problem of the onset of cooperation.
We study the voter model with noise on one-dimensional chains using Monte Carlo simulations and finite-size scaling techniques. We observe that the system evolution toward consensus is deeply affected by the addition of noise, and that the time to reach complete ordering increases with the noise parameter q. In particular, the simulations show that the average domain size scales as xi approximately q(-1/2) whereas the magnetization scales with the number of nodes as m approximately N(-1/2).
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.