Understanding terrorist innovation has emerged as a critical research question.Terrorist innovation challenges status quo assumptions about the nature of terrorist threats and emphasises a need for counterterrorism policy and practice to attempt to not simply react to changes in terrorist tactics and strategies but also to try to anticipate them. This study focused on a detailed examination of the 1972 Munich Olympics attack and draws on the wide range of open source accounts available, including from terrorists directly involved but also from among the authorities and victims. Using an analytical framework proposed by Rasmussen and Hafez (2010), several key drivers are identified and described, both internal to the group and external to its environment. The study concludes that the innovation shown by Black September was predictable and that Munich represented a profound security failure as much as it did successful terrorist innovation.

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The article examines via the cases of Northern Ireland, the Basque country and Corsica the theories and practice of negotiating methods in long-standing violent intrastate conflicts. Despite the uniqueness of each case depending on contextual and circumstantial parameters this article reaches general answers that contribute to establishing commonalities vis-à-vis conflict resolution and the effectiveness of certain peace processes and the failure of others. In general, the three case studies show that policies designed to accommodate fuller recognition and rights to an ethnic community have been more successful in preventing or diminishing polarisation and violent conflict than rigid policies. For a long lasting solution the parties involved would have to redefine their relationship in a way that either they could realise their goals without violent conflict or in a way that their goals would no longer conflict.

Borders and boundaries can represent old narratives, which often, however, cannot deal with new realities. Borders are inflexible, but reality is flexible and fluid. This is augmented in crisis situations. Multi-ethnicity and history run in parallel, as shared cultures often precede and transcend Westphalia and institutionally imposed borders. For cultures with roots in antiquity, top-down established borders appear to lack legitimacy, as these cultures place more emphasis on historical similarities and traditions of peoples. Thus, what is more important: cultural and historical commonalities or institutional top-down constructions? This article examines the impact of the prioritization of top-down ethno-religious homogeneity over lasting conflict resolution. Through an interdisciplinary approach, the article draws a number of hypotheses from the fields of conflict resolution, territoriality, and nation building and tests these hypotheses on the specific case of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange (CPE) between Greece and Turkey and the dual role of the Mediterranean as a security bridge or barrier. This article highlights a “how-not-to” scenario in conflict resolution and argues that efforts to form apparent homogeneous nation-states led to short-term, incomplete conflict termination with a lasting impact, while conflict resolution remained elusive.