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In this paper we exploit the choice allowed by IFRS regarding the presentation of interest payments on the cash flow statement to answer two related questions: First, whether the classification choice is explained by firm reporting incentives and second, whether it is value relevant. Using a UK sample, we find that firms reporting losses, with a greater proportion of their debt stemming from public sources, with CFO-based covenants and greater increases in leverage in the year of adoption are less likely to report interest payments in cash flows from operating activities (CFOA). Results also suggest that the incentive to meet or beat analyst CFO forecasts decreases, but strong corporate governance increases the probability of including interest payments in CFOA. Based on the assumption that the decision not to classify interest payments in CFOA captures lower disclosure quality or poor future expected performance, we posit that these firms should also exhibit lower valuations. Results obtained after correcting for self-selection bias confirm this assertion. We conclude that managers' decision not to classify interest payments in CFOA is consistent with the opportunistic use of the choice allowed by IFRS. 2The determinants and valuation effects of classification choice on the statement of cash flows "Therefore, how an entity presents information in its financial statements is of utmost importance in communicating financial information to those who use that information to make decisions in their capacity as capital providers.

This paper investigates whether the mandatory IFRS adoption has affected the informativeness of analyst recommendation revisions in Europe. Although prior studies document that IFRS adoption improved analyst forecast attributes, the impact of IFRS cannot be completely assessed without examining how the market reacts to information-rich events in an environment with enhanced disclosure. To examine this question we utilize a difference-in-differences design using as main control sample firms that had voluntarily adopted IFRS before the EU's mandated switch. Overall, our evidence suggests that after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, both analyst upgrades and downgrades are more informative. These results hold after controlling for a number of variables that capture analyst, firm and information environment characteristics and are robust to a number of sensitivity analyses including the use of a US control sample. Finally, we examine whether our results are sensitive to the level of accounting enforcement. We find that analyst downgrades are more informative in the post-IFRS period for firms in both high and low enforcement environments. Analyst upgrades, however, are more informative only if they are issued for firms in high enforcement countries.

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The case of Cyprus with respect to the adoption of IFRS is unique given the country's strong reliance on international business and accounting-related services. As such, Cyprus has required the use of IFRS since 1981 not only for publicly-listed firms but also for private companies regardless of their size.Cyprus' reluctance to fully transpose Directive 2013/34/EU into national law can't be unrelated to its long-standing requirement of financial statements that are not only prepared under IFRS but are also audited for all types of corporations registered in the Republic. We conclude that transposing the new Accounting Directive in its entirety into national law could have adverse effects on the Government tax revenue, the GDP of the services sector and the credibility of Cyprus as an international business and financial services center.