This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link ABSTRACTThis article examines the role of the shadow banking system in the global financial crisis of 2007-9. In order to do this, one must first explain the reasons for the explosive growth of shadow banking in the immediate precrisis era. Current explanations for this growth tend to hold two contrasting positions: one emphasising factors endogenous to the banking sector (notably regulatory arbitrage and financial innovation); the other emphasising exogenous factors (notably the 'search for yield'). Integrating these two explanations, in this article we develop a disaggregated view of the shadow banking system. After clarifying the nature of the relation between the regulated and shadow banking systems, we inquire more closely into the different entities that inhabit the shadow banking system, the different activities that these entities performed and the different financial products that these entities supplied. The disaggregated view of shadow banking suggests that while some parts of the system played an important role in the initial subprime phase of the crisis through their involvement with the toxic securities that were at its centre, other parts of the system were key to the subsequent money and inter-bank phases of the crisis through their close ties with the regulated banks.

This is the accepted version of the paper. This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/8547/ Link to published version: http://dx.

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Has the global credit crunch shifted the foundations of global financial architecture away from the philosophy of ‘neoliberalism’? In this article, we argue that the neoliberal project is most probably dead and buried, despite the apparent commitment, which we detail in this article, to the spirit of neoliberal thinking in economic thought. By analysing three constitutive elements of neoliberalism (its public, private and regulatory components) before and after the credit crunch, we reveal important geopolitical shifts which are likely to prevent a return to ‘business as usual’ in the world of finance. We find that the defining trend among these changes is the global rise of the Eurozone. Specifically, we argue that the ideal, Anglo-Saxon model of neoliberalism was viable because it was heavily subsidised from around the world. Accordingly, the key to the future of Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism lies with the willingness of European, East Asian and Middle Eastern creditors to continue extending their financial support to the Anglo-Saxon model of finance. We believe that they are unlikely to do so in the future. Spurred by the magnitude of the credit crunch, the rise of Europe is progressively weakening each of the three dimensions of Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism we identify in this article.

Abstract