In Causation and evidence-based practice: an ontological review, Kerry et al. argue that evidence-based practice (EBP) should revise its understanding of causation, and take on board a dispositionalist ontology. We point out that the challenges from complexity discussed by Kerry et al., are not properly addressed by their proposed ontology. Rather, the difference making views of causation Kerry et al. criticize, spell out the relevant aspects of causation, and have a range of advantages compared to dispositionalist accounts. We explore some of these here, with a special focus on the role of causal assumptions in inferences from scientific evidence to clinical decisions. A philosophical account should help us explicate the assumptions that go into causal inference in EBM. In doing so, it enables an understanding of the various ways in which these assumptions might fail, and of how they can be justified.

A wide range of gene knockout experiments shows that functional stability is an important feature of biological systems. On this backdrop, we present an argument for higher-level causation based on counterfactual dependence. Furthermore, we sketch a metaphysical picture providing resources to explain the metaphysical nature of functional stability, higher-level causation, and the relevant notion of levels. Our account aims to clarify the role empirical results and philosophical assumptions should play in debates about reductionism and higher-level causation. It thereby contributes to the development of a philosophical foundation for systems biology.

Understanding how individual agency and group agency relate is of great importance for a range of philosophical and practical concerns, including responsibility ascription and institutional design. This article discusses the relation between corporate and individual responsibility in agency—in particular, the relation between corporate and individual control of actions. First, I criticize Christian List and Philip Pettit’s causal account of combined corporate and individual control. Second, I develop an alternative account in terms of structural control, and I show how this gives a better grasp of the issue. Third, I argue for an act-dualism that complements my account of control and sheds further light on the relation between corporate and individual agency and responsibility.

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