A proof-theoretic characterization of logical languages that form suitable bases for Prolog-like programming languages is provided. This characterization is based on the principle that the declarative meaning of a logic program, provided by provability in a logical system, should coincide with its operational meaning, provided by interpreting logical connectives as simple and fixed search instructions. The operational semantics is formalized by the identification of a class of cut-free sequent proofs called uniform proofs. A uniform proof is one that can be found by a goal-directed search that respects the interpretation of the logical connectives as search instructions. The concept of a uniform proof is used to define the notion of an abstract logic programming language, and it is shown that first-order and higherorder Horn clauses with classical provability are examples of such a language. Horn clauses are then generalized to hereditary Harrop formulas and it is shown that first-order and higher-order versions of this new class of formulas are also abstract logic programming languages if the inference rules are those of either intuitionistic or minimal logic. The programming language significance of the various generalizations to first-order Horn clauses is briefly discussed.

We formalize the Dolev-Yao model of security protocols, using a notation based on multiset rewriting with existentials. The goals are to provide a simple formal notation for describing security protocols, to formalize the assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model using this notation, and to analyze the complexity of the secrecy problem under various restrictions. We prove that, even for the case where we restrict the size of messages and the depth of message encryption, the secrecy problem is undecidable for the case of an unrestricted number of protocol roles and an unbounded number of new nonces. We also identify several decidable classes, including a DEXP-complete class when the number of nonces is restricted, and an NP-complete class when both the number of nonces and the number of roles is restricted. We point out a remaining open complexity problem, and discuss the implications these results have on the general topic of protocol analysis.

Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the "Dolev-Yao model." In this paper, we use a multiset rewriting formalism, based on linear logic, to state the basic assumptions of this model. A characteristic of our formalism is the way that existential quantification provides a succinct way of choosing new values, such as new keys or nonces. We define a class of theories in this formalism that correspond to finite-length protocols, with a bounded initial-ization phase but allowing unboundedly many instances of each protocol role (e.g., client, server, initiator, or respon-der). Undecidability is proved for a restricted class of these protocols, and PSPACE-completeness is claimed for a class further restricted to have no new data (nonces). Since it is a fragment of linear logic, we can use our notation directly as input to linear logic tools, allowing us to do proof search for attacks with relatively little programming effort, and to formally verify protocol transformations and optimizations.

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