The human prefrontal cortex is a structurally and functionally heterogenous brain region, including multiple subregions that have been linked to different large-scale brain networks. It contributes to a broad range of mental phenomena, from goal-directed thought and executive functions to mind-wandering and psychedelic experience. Here we review what is known about the functions of different prefrontal subregions and their affiliations with large-scale brain networks to examine how they may differentially contribute to the diversity of mental phenomena associated with prefrontal function. An important dimension that distinguishes across different kinds of conscious experience is the stability or variability of mental states across time. This dimension is a central feature of two recently introduced theoretical frameworks—the dynamic framework of thought (DFT) and the relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS) model—that treat neurocognitive dynamics as central to understanding and distinguishing between different mental phenomena. Here, we bring these two frameworks together to provide a synthesis of how prefrontal subregions may differentially contribute to the stability and variability of thought and conscious experience. We close by considering future directions for this work.

Thoughts that appear to come to us ‘out of the blue’ or ‘out of nowhere’ are a familiar aspect of mental experience. Such thoughts tend to elicit feelings of surprise and spontaneity. Although we are beginning to understand the neural processes that underlie the arising of such thoughts, little is known about what accounts for their peculiar phenomenology. Here, we focus on one central aspect of this phenomenology—the experience of surprise at their occurrence, as it relates to internal probabilistic predictions regarding mental states. We introduce a distinction between two phenomenologically different types of transitions in thought content: (i) abrupt transitions , which occur at surprising times but lead to unsurprising thought content, and (ii) wayward transitions , which occur at surprising times and also lead to surprising thought content. We examine these two types of transitions using a novel approach that combines probabilistic and predictive processing concepts and principles. We employ two different probability metrics—transition and occurrence probability—to characterize and differentiate between abrupt and wayward transitions. We close by discussing some potentially beneficial ways in which these two kinds of transitions in thought content may contribute to mental function, and how they may be implemented at the neural level. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.

Creative thinking is often viewed as a dynamic process that involves shifts between two distinct modes (or phases) of thought – a generative and an evaluative mode. The generative mode involves the generation of new ideas, whereas the evaluative mode involves cognitive and affective evaluations of these ideas. Although the neurocognitive underpinnings of these two thought modes have received significant attention, the dynamics of transitions between them have remain largely unexplored. Here, we focus on these dynamics and review current evidence from psychology and cognitive neuroscience about the relationships and transitions between the two purported modes of thought. We suggest that two types of evaluative processing—automatic-affective and deliberate (i.e., based in cognitive control)—play pivotal roles in supporting transitions between the generative and evaluative modes. Ultimately, we contend that future research into creative thought should focus on clarifying the timescales at which the two modes of thought may unfold, how the transition rate between them may relate to creative outcomes, and the nature of automatic-affective evaluations made towards thoughts.

Involuntary thinking occurs when mental states arise without intention. Such thoughts can take different forms, such as involuntary autobiographical memories (IAM), ruminative thoughts, and unexpected thoughts—all of which are popular areas of study, albeit in somewhat disparate literatures. Despite these mental states sharing a common thread of feeling involuntary in nature, it is nevertheless unclear what separates them phenomenologically. We conducted a set of exploratory and confirmatory experiments to elucidate the appraisal dimensions behind these forms of involuntary thought, with a particular interest in understanding the phenomenology behind unexpected thoughts that are predicted to violate expectations of both timing and content. Across two experiments, we found that unexpected thoughts had unique appraisal structures compared to the other two forms of involuntary thought: they were less identifiably cued, more surprising in content and timing, and offered new information (i.e., insight). We discuss how these distinctions support recent theories regarding the nature of unexpected thought and its relation to other forms of involuntary thinking, namely IAM and ruminative thought, which are the more commonly studied forms of involuntary thinking.

Creative thinking is often viewed as a dynamic process that involves shifts between two distinct modes (or phases) of thoughta generative and an evaluative mode. The generative mode involves the generation of new ideas, whereas the evaluative mode involves cognitive and affective evaluations of these ideas. Although the neurocognitive underpinnings of these two thought modes have received significant attention, the dynamics of transitions between them have remain largely unexplored.Here, we focus on these dynamics and review current evidence from psychology and cognitive neuroscience about the relationships and transitions between the two purported modes of thought. We suggest that two types of evaluative processingautomatic-affective and deliberate (i.e., based in cognitive control)-play pivotal roles in supporting transitions between the generative and evaluative modes. Ultimately, we contend that future research into creative thought should focus on clarifying the timescales at which the two modes of thought may unfold, how the transition rate between them may relate to creative outcomes, and the nature of automatic-affective evaluations made towards thoughts.