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INTRODUCTIONAristotle's discussion of division is scattered over several texts. Aristotle's very way of dealing with division is afirst reason for this. Each time Aristotle talks about division he is content merely to deal with particular aspects of it as a method. In fact, either he rejects division insofar as a method of proof in APr B 31 and in APo B 5 , or he documents the connections between division and the hunting out of a definition in APo B 13, or he raises criticisms against a particular version of division in PA A 2-4. But Aristotle's full confidence in division as a method is a second reason for this. It is often said that Aristotle developed division as a method for the collection and the study of zoological data. This is true only in part: Aristotle, in fact, deals with division in non-zoological contexts and for non-zoological purposes as well. In Metaph. Z 12 Aristotle is concerned with the unity of definition, and he appeals to division because this method can help him to solve this particular definitional puzzle. In APo B 13 he exploits division and its properties to offer a solution to another definitional puzzle which undermines the possibility of giving any definition and which all extant Greek commentators ascribe to Speusippus.Even if Aristotle's discussion of division is so scattered, it provides us with a theory of division. A brief summary of the major results Aristotle obtains helps to make this point clear. In APo B 13 he focuses on the role that division plays in the search for a definition. Whatever this role is, it cannot be that of proving a definition. Both in APr A 31 and in APo B 5 Aristotle deals with the claim that division comes deductively to its conclusion, or that division proves the definition it reaches. He does not agree with this claim and explains why it cannot be. To argue that division has no inferential power Aristotle undertakes a formal analysis of the procedure through which a definition is obtained by division. On the other hand, PA A 2-4 is nothing but a presentation of his own method of *I use the following abbreviations: PA for Parts of Animals; APr for Prior Analytics; APo for Posterior Analytics; Metaph. for Metaphysics.APo B 13,97a6-22. One might claim that the way Aristotle's extant work has come to us is a third, external, reason which explains, at least in part, why Aristotle's discussion is scattered over several texts. In fact, all today's editions of Aristotle's work ultimately go back to Andronicus of Rhodes, who published the great edition o f Aristotle in the 1st century BC, and he probably had to make some arbitrary choices about where some of our texts were to be inserted. At least Metaph. Z 12 and PA A 2-4 seem to be relatively independent compositions. Metaph. Z 12 does not fit in the plan of Book Zeta as a whole. See on this point M. Frede and G. Patzig, Aristoteles. Metaphysik. Band II: Kommentar (Miinchen 1988) 221-223. On the other hand, PA A is clearly distinct from the rest of PA. This book is a collection of at least three independent...

Andrea Falcon's work is guided by the exegetical ideal of recreating the mind of Aristotle and his distinctive conception of the theoretical enterprise. In this concise exploration of the significance of the celestial world for Aristotle's science of nature, Falcon investigates the source of discontinuity between celestial and sublunary natures and argues that the conviction that the natural world exhibits unity without uniformity is the ultimate reason for Aristotle's claim that the heavens are made of a special body, unique to them. This book presents Aristotle as a totally engaged, systematic investigator whose ultimate concern was to integrate his distinct investigations into a coherent interpretation of the world we live in, all the while mindful of human limitations to what can be known. Falcon reads in Aristotle the ambition of an extraordinarily curious mind and the confidence that that ambition has been largely fulfilled.

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IntroductionAs Aristotle himself says,A.Po.2.13 is an attempt to provide some rules to hunt out the items predicated in what something is, namely to discover definitions. Since most of this chapter is devoted to the discussion of some rules of division(diairesis), it may be inferred that somehow division plays a central role in the discovery of definitions. However, in the following pages I shall not discuss what this role is. Nor shall I discuss what place division has in the wider discussion of definition and explanation as it emerges fromA.Po. 2.1 shall rather focus on the argument that Aristotle reports and discusses inA.Po.2.13.97a6–22, and which our extant sources ascribe to Speusippus. As will become clear later on, this argument undermines the possibility of giving any definition, and Aristotle deals with it here because he can block it by exploiting some properties of the method of division.