This paper investigates the presence of depositor discipline in the U.S. banking sector. We test whether depositors penalize (discipline) banks for poor performance by withdrawing their uninsured deposits. While focusing on the movements in uninsured deposits, we also account for the possibility that banks may be forced to pay a risk premium in the form of higher interest rates to induce depositors not to withdraw their uninsured deposits. Our results support the existence of depositor discipline: a weak bank may not necessarily be able to stop a deposit drain by raising its uninsured deposit interest rates.3

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance.

This paper explores the concept of global liquidity, its measurement and macro-financial importance. We construct two sets of indicators for global liquidity: a quantity series distinguishing between core and noncore liabilities of financial intermediatires and a corresponding price series. Using price and quantity indicators simultaneously, it is possible to distinguish between shocks to the supply and demand for global liquidity, and isolate their impact on the economy. Our results confirm that global liquidity conditions matter for economic and financial stability, and points to indicators whose regular monitoring could be valuable to policymakers.

While a large body of literature examines the environmental impact of trade on the environment, this discussion focuses largely on the context of inter-industry trade. Empirical evidence has long suggested that an increasing share of international trade takes the form of intra- rather than inter-industry trade. In an attempt to fill this gap, the present paper uses a price-setting duopoly model of intra-industry trade to highlight the environmental consequences of trade liberalization when oligopolistic rivalry rather than comparative advantage drives international trade. We find that the environmental impact of trade liberalization depends mostly on two factors, namely, on the nature of pollution (i.e. whether it is local, transboundary or global) and on which country liberalizes trade (i.e. whether it is the 'clean' country or the 'dirty' country).Trade, environment, intra-industry trade,

This paper assesses how various types of financial risk such as credit risk, market risk, and liquidity risk affect banking stability in emerging Europe. It also examines how the quality of supervisory standards may have mitigated the vulnerabilities arising from these risk factors. Using panel data, the paper finds that (1) credit quality is of general concern especially in circumstances where credit growth is accelerating; (2) although higher provisioning could adversely affect profits and returns volatility, good supervisory policies on provisioning mitigate such adverse effects; and (3) highly liquid banks are not necessarily more stable because they might be pursuing activities with more volatile returns, but a well-functioning payments system helps to lower the adverse impact on stability. The paper also corroborates earlier evidence of the positive (negative) effect of financial depth (foreign ownership) on stability.[JEL E44, D53] IMF Staff Papers (2010) 57, 25-60.