Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a powerful tool that is more commonly being used to recruit behavioral research participants for accounting research. This manuscript provides practical and technical knowledge learned from firsthand experience to help researchers collect high-quality, defendable data for research purposes. We highlight two issues of particular importance when using MTurk: (1) accessing qualified participants, and (2) validating collected data. To address these issues, we discuss alternative methods of carrying out screens and different data validation techniques researchers may want to consider. We also demonstrate how some of the techniques discussed were implemented for a recent data collection. Finally, we contrast the use of unpaid screens with merely putting participation requirements in the MTurk instructions to examine the effectiveness of using screens. We find that screening questions significantly reduce the number of manipulation check failures as well as significantly increase the usable responses per paid participant.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether intention to report fraud varies by organization type or fraud type. Employees who self-select into not-for-profits may be inherently different from employees at other organizations. Design/methodology/approach The authors conduct a 2 × 2 experiment in which (n=107) individuals with a bookkeeping or accounting background respond to a fraud scenario. Analysis of covariance models are used for data analysis. Findings The authors find evidence that not-for-profit employees are more likely to report fraud and that reporting intention does not differ significantly by fraud type. Research limitations/implications Limitations of this study include the simulation of a fraud through a hypothetical incident and the use of online participants. Practical implications This study expands the commitment literature by examining the role that commitment plays in the judgment and decision-making process of a whistleblower. Findings suggest affective commitment, which is an employee’s emotional attachment to the organization, and mediate the path between organization type and reporting intention. Affective commitment significantly predicts whistleblowing in not-for-profit organizations but not in for-profit organizations. Originality/value This research provides insight into how organization type influences whistleblowing intentions through constructs such as organizational commitment and public service motivation.

Purpose Based on exchange theory and the generalized norm of reciprocity, psychological contracts perceived by employees are believed to have dysfunctional consequences for organizations if breached. This paper aims to study the willingness of employees to report fraud, as such is an important aspect of internal control for organizations. Design/methodology/approach A 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment was conducted in which 99 participants with diverse accounting backgrounds were first asked questions about their preconceived beliefs (psychological contract) regarding how reports of unethical conduct would be managed, and their reaction if these beliefs were broken (psychological contract violation). Participants were given a hypothetical situation of fraud and then asked to indicate their likelihood of reporting fraud to a supervisor. Findings The main hypotheses are that employees will be less likely to report fraud when the organization fails to signal the presence of a positive ethical environment or when management reacts weakly to previous reports of unethical activity. The data and findings support these hypotheses. Additional testing also reveals that a psychological contract violation mediates the relationship between the outcome of previous reports and the intention to report fraud. Research limitations/implications As with any experimental study, this study’s results come with limitations. Reading an overly simplistic scenario that omits real world details and providing intention to report is very different from actually reporting fraud in one’s own place of employment. Therefore, reporting intentions may vary from actual reporting behavior. Further, reporting motivation (self-defense, altruism, etc.) and concern over retaliation are not measured. Practical implications Employees have expectations surrounding ethical corporate environments. Psychological contract violations occur as a result of broken expectations and are common in the workforce. In this study, a breakdown in the internal control environment because of a poor ethical culture, caused an even greater breakdown in internal controls because of employees’ decreased reporting intentions. Social implications Psychological contract violations impact employees’ intention to report fraud. These violations need to be understood so that additional measures and safeguards can be instituted when employees are not acting as a fraud defense or detection mechanism. During such times when there is a breakdown in this type of internal control (that is, when employees might be hesitant to report fraud), extra safeguards against fraud, additional procedures to detect fraud, and enhanced employee training encouraging reporting of suspected unethical conduct, become even more important. Originality/value Strong experimental methods provide a rigorous way to evaluate a problem of our day: job insecurity caused by rampant organizational turbulence. The hidden cost is expressed in terms of how less can be expected of employees as a first line of defense against fraud.

Archival research suggests that nonprofit organizations are inaccurately reporting significant asset diversions on IRS Form 990. This suggests that information reported on Form 990, which is relied on by nonprofit stakeholders, may be misleading. As a result, this behavioral study investigates three possible causes for the under-reporting of significant diversions of assets, including reading the Form 990 instructions, how the threshold for reporting is met, and the threat of outside detection of the theft. Our findings suggest that reading the instructions for Form 990, where the IRS’s definition of a significant diversion of assets can be found, positively and significantly influences disclosure of an asset diversion. We also examine press release reporting of a significant diversion of assets, as nonprofits may try to get ahead of the disclosure on Form 990. We find that risk of detection of the theft is a significant predictor of press release disclosure.

Scant coverage of fraud in nonprofit organizations and smaller firms exists despite surveys and headlines indicating fraud prevalence is at greater levels among these firms than at for-profit and larger firms. Applying a combination of stakeholder salience theory and whistleblowing theory, this paper establishes a background for such comparisons. Results of a survey of 153 fulltime employees uncover differences in whistleblowing between for-profit and nonprofit organization types. We find those who work at for-profit organizations are more likely to whistleblow than those who work for nonprofit organizations. The results and supplemental analysis suggest whistleblowing intention for fraud is significantly more likely for larger organizations (measured by number of employees) regardless of organization type. Further, as geographic reach increases, for-profit employees are increasingly likely to report.