Two prominent relational egalitarians, Elizabeth Anderson and Niko Kolodny, object to giving people in a democratic community differential voting weights on the grounds that doing so would lead to unequal relations between them. Their claim is that deviating from a “one-person, one-vote” scheme is incompatible with realizing relational egalitarian justice. In this article, I argue that they are wrong. I do so by showing that people can relate as moral, epistemic, social, and empirical equals in a scheme with differential voting weights. I end the article by showing that from the perspective of relational egalitarianism, it is sometimes true that differential voting weights are more just than equal voting weights.

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As a solution to the boundary problem, the question of who should take part in making democratic decisions, the all-affected principle has gained widespread support. An unexplored issue in relation to the all-affected principle is whether there is an asymmetry between being affected negatively and positively. Is it the case that only being negatively affected, and not positively affected, by a decision generates a claim to inclusion under the all-affected principle? I call this the question of asymmetry. Some answer the question of asymmetry affirmatively. I believe they are wrong and argue, instead, that we must answer this question by looking at the reasons underlying the all-affected principle. I identify two main reasons that have been proposed to underlie the all-affected principle—(1) the opportunity for interest protection and (2) self-government—and show why both of them entail that answering the question of asymmetry affirmatively is unfounded. The upshot is that both being affected negatively and positively by a decision should generate a claim to inclusion on the all-affected principle. This makes a difference for democratic decision making on contemporary issues such as immigration, climate, and welfare policy.

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Party switching by members of Parliament is a common phenomenon in democracies. Despite several empirical investigations of this phenomenon, party switching has not yet been investigated from a moral point of view. This article aims to fill this gap. By analyzing party switching from the point of view of relational egalitarianism, the article argues that party switching may be wrong because (i) the politician thereby acts on selfish interests which should be excluded from their decision-making as a representative; (ii) the politician thereby treats their constituents and/or party members paternalistically; and (iii) it expresses relational inequality between the member of Parliament and their voters or between the member of Parliament and their party members. There are instances, however, in which party switching is not wrong, and the last part of the article discusses what this means for whether party switching should be prohibited.