As a philosopher educated in the classics, as a crucial communicator of French thinking to the oftentimes heated German-language debates of the 1980s and 1990s, as the author of monographies on the questions of the strange, on answering and responsive rationality, on attentiveness, on “phenomenotechnology” and on problems of moral philosophy, Bernhard Waldenfels points out a direction to contemporary European philosophy that is entirely his own – all of it in the name of phenomenology, and first and foremost, the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. With a tight connection to the classical philosophical tradition as well as to contemporary scientific disciplines, literature, the arts and everyday life, Waldenfels has lent his own signature to phenomenology. In this interview, we ask Bernhard Waldenfels to situate himself with respect to the question: What is phenomenological philosophy and what does it accomplish?

Vieles spricht dafür, dass das Dispositiv der Schuld, das mit der Leitunterscheidung erlaubt/verboten operiert, im Verlauf des 20. Jahrhunderts in ein Dispositiv der Eignung umgebaut wurde, dessen Leitunterscheidung können/nichtkönnen lautet. In diesem Zusammenhang spielen die um 1900 aufkommende Angewandte Psychologie und die von ihr entwickelten Prüfungstechniken eine entscheidende Rolle. Der Aufsatz demonstriert dies exemplarisch an den Arbeiten von William Stern (Schülerauslese), Hugo Münsterberg (Betriebspsychologie) und Kurt Lewin(social management). Dabei zeigt sich, dass das Eignungsdispositiv auch solche psychologischen Techniken zu integrieren vermag, die ursprünglich nicht für die Eignungsprüfung konzipiert wurden. </br></br>This paper argues that during the 20th century the dispositive of guilt (which operates with the principal distinction permitted/forbidden) is restructured as a dispositive of aptitude, which relies on the principal distinction able/not able. In this context, the (applied psychology), which emerges at the turn of the century and the technologies of examination it developed play a significant role. This can be demonstrated with reference to the works of William Stern (selection of students), Hugo Münsterberg (work psychology) and Kurt Lewin (social management). Furthermore, it can be shown that the dispositive of ability can also integrate those psychological techniques that originally were not conceived for ability testing.

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Hegelscriticism of Kantsphilosophyofrepresentation can be understood as ashift from representation (Vorstellung)t op resentation (Darstellung). This shift affects not only theoretical but also practical philosophy.Abasic idea of Hegels Phenomenology is that freedomcan onlyberealized if individuals present themselves as free.Hegel often calls this conflictual process of presentation "probation" or "verification"(Bewährung). In acts of practical verification, individuals do not simply asserttheir identity,but carry out a liberating break withg iven identities.T his motive was very important for Adornos philosophy of the non-identical, but was lost in the following generations of the Frankfurt School. Theessay showsthat it currently lives on in Jacques Rancirestheory of radical democracy.Itargues that Rancire is closer to some important intuitions of early Critical Theory than AxelHonnethstheory of recognition.T othis end, it examines adiscussion betweenHonneth and Rancire that took place in Frankfurtin2009.

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