Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in www.econstor.euThe market value of energy efficiency in owner-occupied and rental apartments: Evidence from the Berlin housing market AbstractGrowing scarcity of fossil fuels and climate protection targets require an increasing energy efficiency of the housing stock and substantial private investment. However, the incentives to raise energy efficiency may be different for owner-occupants and landlords; often named as the "landlord-tenant dilemma." This is particularly important for countries with a large residential rental sector, like Germany. Nevertheless, previous literature largely focuses on the pay offs owneroccupants receive from energy efficiency investments leaving out the rental market. This paper addresses this gap by comparing the capitalization of energy efficiency in selling prices (rents) for both types of residences. For this purpose apartment prices and rents from the Berlin housing market are analyzed in hedonic regressions. The estimations reveal that energy efficiency is well capitalized in apartment prices and rents. The comparison of implicit prices and the net present value of energy cost savings/rents reveals that investors anticipate future energy and house price movements reasonably. However, in the rental segment, the value of future energy cost savings exceeds tenants' implicit willingness to pay by factor 2.98. This can either be interpreted as a result of market power of tenants, uncertainty in the rental relationship, or the "landlord-tenant dilemma."

Second generation rent control seeks to prevent negative quantity effects by exempting newly built units. The artificially lowered rent in the controlled segment makes renting attractive for households that would otherwise not have rented in the market, replacing households with higher willingness to pay for housing. These households bid up prices in the free market segment, giving rise to an opposite-sign spillover from the controlled to the free market (Mense, Michelsen, and Kholodilin 2017). This paper documents a positive effect of “second generation” rent control on the value of vacant, buildable land.

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Many empirical studies in the fields of urban and environmental economics rely on the hedonic pricing framework. This paper draws attention to two important elements that are not covered by this theory: uncertainty and relocation costs. It develops a theoretical model where agents face uncertainty, but may accumulate savings as a form of self‐insurance. It shows that uncertainty pushes up relocation costs due to the option value of waiting, while self‐insurance helps to reduce this lock‐in problem. Moreover, the model suggests that the implicit price of environmental quality increases with uncertainty even if agents are risk‐neutral.