Lineare RegressionMit Hilfe der linearen Regression lässt sich der Einfluss einer oder mehrerer erklärender Variablen X 1 ,...,X m (z.B. X 1 = Alter, X 2 = Geschlecht und X 3 = Rauchen) auf eine stetige Zielvariable Y (z.B. Y = systolischer Blutdruck) statistisch untersuchen (3). Liegt nur eine erklärende Variable X vor, spricht man von der einfachen linearen Regression (engl.: simple linear regression) und verwendet die Geradengleichung (5)Im Fall mehrerer erklärender Variablen X 1 ,...,X m liegt das Modell der multiplen linearen Regression (engl.: multiple linear regression) vor, das durch die Gleichungbeschrieben wird (3). Die Bedeutung der multiplen Regressionsmodelle in der medizinischen Statistik liegt zum einen darin, den gemeinsamen Einfluss mehrerer Variablen auf eine Zielvariable untersuchen zu können und zum anderen in der Möglich-keit, den interessierenden Effekt einer Variable bezüglich anderer Variablen zu adjustieren, um eine Verzerrung (engl.: bias) bei der Effektschätzung zu reduzieren (3). Logistische Regression

We examine how the erosion of morals in markets depends on the market power of individual traders. Previously studied single-unit markets provide market power to individual traders by limiting the roles of two forces: (i) the replacement logic, whereby immoral trading is justified by the belief that others would trade otherwise; (ii) market selection, by which the least moral trader determines quantities. In an experiment, we compare single-unit to (more common) multi-unit markets which may activate these forces. We find that, in contrast to single-unit markets, multi-unit markets show full erosion of morals.Especially the replacement logic drives this finding. In addition, we find that (i) market experience leads to biased social learning, whereby subjects believe that others are less moral than they actually are; (ii) erosion of morals persists partially after multi-unit markets; (iii) changes in social norms are not driving these results.

The high prices of innovative medicines endanger access to care worldwide. Sustainable prices need to be affordable while sufficiently incentivizing research and development (R&D) investments. A proposed solution is increased transparency. Proponents argue that price and R&D cost confidentiality are drivers of high prices. On the contrary, supporters of confidentiality claim that confidentiality enables targeted discounts which make treatments affordable; moreover, pharmaceutical companies argue that R&D investments would suffer with more transparency. Despite the political relevance, limited empirical evidence exists on the effects of transparency regulations. We contribute to fill this gap with an experiment where we replicate the EU pharmaceutical market in a laboratory setting. In a randomized controlled study, we analyzed how participants, 400 students located in four European countries, negotiated in the current system of Price Secrecy in comparison with innovative bargaining settings where either prices only (Price Transparency) or prices and R&D costs (Full Transparency) were made transparent to buyers. We found that Price transparency had no statistically significant effect on average prices or number of patients treated and made R&D investments significantly smaller (−16.86%; P: 0.0024). On the other hand, Full Transparency reduced prices (−26%; P: 0.0004) and held the number of patients constant at the level of Price Secrecy. It produced price convergence between countries with low and high health budgets, and, despite lower prices, had no effect on R&D investments. Our findings provide novel evidence that combining price and R&D cost transparency could be an effective policy to contribute to sustainable medicine prices. See related article by Franzen et al. (Cancer Discov 2022;12:299–302).

We examine how the erosion of morals in markets depends on the market power of individual traders. Previously studied single-unit markets provide market power to individual traders by limiting the roles of two forces: (i) the replacement logic, whereby immoral trading is justified by the belief that others would trade otherwise; (ii) market selection, by which the least moral trader determines quantities. In an experiment, we compare single-unit to (more common) multi-unit markets which may activate these forces. We find that, in contrast to single-unit markets, multi-unit markets show full erosion of morals.Especially the replacement logic drives this finding. In addition, we find that (i) market experience leads to biased social learning, whereby subjects believe that others are less moral than they actually are; (ii) erosion of morals persists partially after multi-unit markets; (iii) changes in social norms are not driving these results.

No abstract