Experimental research (articulation tests) of influence of forcing speech effect on security of speech information of leakage from technical channels was executed. Results of experiment and theoretical calculations are compared. Conclusions and justifications of the received results are made.

Modern methods of protecting personal information often uses the voice biometric data of the owner of the information to identify the user. When the owner of the information voices the passphrase, he confirms his identity. However, attackers take advantage of the imperfection of such systems and develop methods for voice cloning, to create a twinkly voice for a cyberattack on personal data protection systems. Within the framework of this article, an attempt is made to explore existing methods for detecting cloned voices in order to protect information and counteract cyberattacks. Also, to achieve results, detection systems will be tested on a sample of Russian-language voice recordings taken from open sources. A comparative assessment of existing approaches is carried out in terms of their practical applicability. In particular, the requirements for the occupied memory of a computing device, computational complexity, complexity in implementation and data collection for training were taken into account. In addition, an analysis of the existing prerequisites and trends for the use of voice synthesis and substitution systems was carried out, potential risks were described, and examples of possible damage from the theft of biometric data were given. An attempt was also made to describe the experimental procedure for evaluating the performance of the considered methods with specifying and clarifying conditions. The criteria for verification and validation of the results are set, which allow drawing conclusions about the efficiency of the systems.

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This article presents the results of recovering signals of spurious electromagnetic radiation of a video path using an SDR receiver. This work demonstrates the existence of a potential risk of leakage of confidential information through a technical channel of information leakage due to spurious electromagnetic radiation of a video path, bypassing traditional cryptographic and physical methods of information protection. An attack can be carried out by an attacker without special technical knowledge and special professional expensive equipment. The presented stand makes it possible to simplify research related to spurious electromagnetic radiation, as well as to apply this technology to build a learning process in this domain. In the course of the work, a description of the concept of a technical channel of information leakage and a brief description of the side electromagnetic radiation of the video path are given. The following briefly describes the SDR technology, the selected USRP B210 receiver, and the cross-platform open source GNU Radio software package. The demonstration stand is described in detail and the results of image reconstruction are given. In addition, two stages of the development of a demonstration stand are considered: using a simulation signal and a real intercepted signal. A demonstration stand with simulation signals serves to develop a user's understanding of the properties of spurious electromagnetic radiation, as well as possible obstacles to converting an intercepted signal into an image. The studies of the real intercepted signal were carried out on a monitor with a set resolution of 1280×1024 and a screen refresh rate of 60 Hz. An analog VGA (Video Graphics Array) interface was used to connect the monitor. The dependence of the quality of the reconstructed image on the set sampling frequency of the SDR receiver is shown.

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