We examine the roles of subnational and national governments in Canada and the USA vis-à-vis protective public health response in the onset phase of the global COVID-19 pandemic. This period was characterized in both countries by incomplete and incorrect information as well as the uncertainty regarding which level of government should be responsible for which policies. The crisis represents an opportunity to study how national and subnational governments respond to such policy challenges. In this paper, we present a unique dataset which catalogues the policy responses of US states and Canadian provinces as well as those of the respective federal governments: the Protective Policy Index (PPI). We then compare the US and Canada along several dimensions including: the absolute values of subnational levels of the index relative to the total protections enjoyed by citizens, the relationship between "early threat" (as measured by the mortality rate near the start of the public health crisis) and the evolution of the PPI, and finally, the institutional/legislative origins of the protective health policies. We find that the subnational contribution to policy is more important for both the US and Canada as compared to their national-level policies, and is unrelated in scope to our "early threat" measure. We also show that the institutional origin of the policies as evidenced by COVID-19 response differs greatly between the two countries and has implications for the evolution of federalism in each.

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Introduction This study connects the aggregate strength of public health policies taken in response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in the U.S. states to the governors’ party affiliations and to state-level outcomes. Understanding the relationship between politics and public health measures can better prepare American communities for what to expect from their governments in a future crisis and encourage advocacy for delegating public health decisions to medical professionals. Methods The Public Health Protective Policy Index (PPI) captures the strength of policy response to COVID-19 at the state level. The authors estimated a Bayesian model that links the rate of disease spread to PPI. The model also accounted for the possible state-specific undercounting of cases and controls for state population density, poverty, number of physicians, cardiovascular disease, asthma, smoking, obesity, age, racial composition, and urbanization. A Bayesian linear model with natural splines of time was employed to link the dynamics of PPI to governors’ party affiliations. Results A 10–percentage point decrease in PPI was associated with an 8% increase in the expected number of new cases. Between late March and November 2020 and at the state-specific peaks of the pandemic, the PPI in the states with Democratic governors was about 10 percentage points higher than in the states with Republican governors. Conclusions Public health measures were stricter in the Democrat-led states, and stricter public health measures were associated with a slower growth of COVID-19 cases. The apparent politicization of public health measures suggests that public health decision making by health professionals rather than political incumbents could be beneficial.

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Prevalent models of issue voting view vote choice as a choice among party policies. Choice sets are implicitly assumed to be the same for all voters, and their composition is left to researchers' discretion. This article aims to relax such assumptions by presenting a model with a varying probability of inclusion in the choice set. We apply the “constrained choice conditional logistic regression” to survey data from the 1989 parliamentary election in Norway to examine the effects of party identification of voters and electoral viability and policy extremity of parties on individual voters' choice set compositions. Further, we look into the effect of parties' policy positions on their electoral fates under alternative assumptions about the composition of voters' choice sets. We find that voters' choice set composition conditions both the effects of their policy considerations on vote choice and those of parties' policy offerings on their electoral fates.