Online reviews are widely used to propagate the reputations of employers. However, existing research suggests that online reviews often suffer from selection bias-people with extreme opinions are more motivated to select into sharing them than people with moderate opinions, resulting in more extreme ratings. We find that providing incentives for reviewing can reduce this selection bias, because incentives can mitigate the motivational deficit of people who hold moderate opinions. Using data from Glassdoor, a leading employer review website, we find that incentivized ratings are less extreme than voluntary (selfselected) ratings. The likely bias in the distribution of voluntary reviews can affect workers' choice of employers. We complement our investigation with a randomized experiment that provides a cleaner test of selection bias. We again find that voluntary reviews of employers lead to more extreme reviews compared to non-voluntary reviews. Moreover, providing relatively high monetary rewards or a pro-social cue as incentives for reviewing also lowers the relative prevalence of extreme reviews. Although voluntary employer reviews often suffer from selection bias, incentives can reduce it and help workers make more informed employment choices. Public Significance StatementAlthough online employer reviews are widely used, they may not be representative because employees with extreme opinions are more likely to post online reviews than employees with moderate opinions, resulting in more extreme reviews. We find that providing incentives for reviewing can reduce this selection bias and make online reviews more representative, and more useful.

and participants to seminars at the University of Chicago for their useful comments. We would also like to thank Chen Jiang for excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

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