This article uses the concept of institutional thickness to describe key features of the local governance of economic development. For this purpose, a methodology for the empirical assessment of institutional thickness is developed and applied to the case of Birmingham, England. The results from this empirical analysis are threefold. First, they make it possible to draw some conclusions on the role that local governments can play to promote local economic development. Second, they suggest that institutional thickness is a useful organizing concept for analyses of the local governance of economic development. Finally, they demonstrate the value of a verifiable and replicable methodology for the detection and measurement of local institutional conditions and of governance arrangements.In 1994 Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift edited a collection of essays under the title Globalisation, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe. The foundation article, 'Living in the global', introduced the concept of institutional thickness.This article is a reassessment of that concept. It does this, first, by examining why the original authors defined it as they did, how the concept relates to local economic development, and the extent to which it is consistent with recent contributions to institutional theory and local development. The second part of the article shows how a quantitative frame can be put onto the concept to enhance its explanatory power in analyses of local economic development. For this purpose the article develops a case study of one city, Birmingham, England, between 1984 and 2004. The article concludes by reassessing the concept and the derived quantitative methodology in the light of the case study.

The Private Finance Initiative (PFI), introduced to Britain in 1992, has become a major means of procuring public sector infrastructure. It involves long-term contracts whereby private sector suppliers construct and own capital assets and provide services for which they are paid on the basis of availability or use. This paper focuses on the early stages of a PFI procurement, the decision to use the PFI rather than any other form of procurement. In 2004 and 2006, the UK Treasury issued new Guidance as to how this should be done. There are two stages to this Guidance: qualitative and quantitative assessments. This paper comments on some of the key issues in the quantitative assessments: the treatment of risk, of residual and life-time costs, of tax, of rates of return and of the appropriate use of discounted fl ow techniques when fi nance is a constraint for an investing agency.

Purpose -Much of the writing on partnerships implicitly assumes that they are beneficial. Other literature points out that partnerships are seldom of equals, and can become instruments of oppression whereby a strong partner gains at the expense of weaker members. This has been taken up by community development specialists with particular reference to the position, at best ambiguous, of representatives or residents of local communities on the boards of regeneration partnerships. This paper aims to review this theory. Design/methodology/approach -Reviews partnerships and briefly considers three types of partnership in the UK: private finance initiatives (PFI) or public-private partnerships (PPP); local strategic partnerships; and local area regeneration partnerships. Findings -Concludes that partnerships need time to grow for confidence to be gained inside as well as outside the partnership; partnerships are not usually of equals, and the position of "community representatives" on the boards of partnerships is intrinsically problematic. However, local area partnerships need them: to make "decisions", to test the likely reception of new ideas, to help sell what is going on. It is likely to prove a serious problem for some PFI/PPP partnerships which are contractually bound for 25 or 30 years; but one may surmise that in many cases partners will fall out and it will be difficult then to deliver the promises that have been made. Originality/value -Partnerships vary, and hence generalisation is difficult. But some important points from the discussion can add to the ongoing dialogue about the nature of partnerships in regeneration.

The years 1946–76 cover the last fifteen years of colonial rule in Tanganyika, and the first fifteen years of Independence. In that period Governments attempted a wide range of policies relating to agriculture. The more important of these are summarised in Table 1. This paper attempts to bring out the historical sequence to show how the perceived weaknesses in one set of policies led to the choice of the next. A general conclusion is that those who controlled the State consistently misunderstood fundamental aspects of peasant agriculture, and over‐estimated what the use of State power could achieve in rural development. More specifically the paper charts a conflict of interest between peasants and bureaucrats beginning in colonial times and continuing today. From a bureaucratic point of view, the peasants are an important section of the economy which they cannot fully control, but which they must attempt to manipulate to extract a surplus of food to feed the cities and export crops to extract the foreign exchange to maintain or expand the State. The peasants view the bureaucrats with mixed feelings: they know that the bureaucrats possess power — to set prices for crops or call in the police force, but they are uncomfortably aware that that power is often used to exploit their labour power.

Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their guidance on improving this paper. We would also like to thank all the farmers around Morogoro who participated and shared their time and views.