Credit (CVA), Debit (DVA) and Funding Valuation Adjustments (FVA) are now familiar valuation adjustments made to the value of a portfolio of derivatives to account for credit risks and funding costs. However, recent changes in the regulatory regime and the increases in regulatory capital requirements has led many banks to include the cost of capital in derivative pricing. This paper formalises the addition of cost of capital by extending the Burgard-Kjaer (2013) semi-replication approach to CVA and FVA to include an addition capital term, Capital Valuation Adjustment (KVA). 1

Potential Future Exposure (PFE) is a standard risk metric for managing business unit counterparty credit risk but there is debate on how it should be calculated. The debate has been whether to use one of many historical ("physical") measures (one per calibration setup), or one of many risk-neutral measures (one per numeraire). However, we argue that limits should be based on the bank's own risk appetite provided that this is consistent with regulatory backtesting and that whichever measure is used it should behave (in a sense made precise) like a historical measure. Backtesting is only required by regulators for banks with IMM approval but we expect that similar methods are part of limit maintenance generally. We provide three methods for computing the bank price of risk from readily available business unit data, i.e. business unit budgets (rate of return) and limits (e.g. exposure percentiles). Hence we define and propose a Risk Appetite Measure, A, for PFE and suggest that this is uniquely consistent with the bank's Risk Appetite Framework as required by sound governance.

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Regulations impose idiosyncratic capital and funding costs for holding derivatives. Capital requirements are costly because derivatives desks are risky businesses; funding is costly in part because regulations increase the minimum funding tenor. Idiosyncratic costs mean no single measure makes derivatives martingales for all market participants. Hence Regulatory-compliant pricing is not risk-neutral. This has implications for exit prices and mark-to-market.