No abstract

The original version of this Article contained an error in the spelling of the author Laurence Faivre, which was incorrectly given as Laurence Faive. This has now been corrected in both the PDF and HTML versions of the Article.

National Antarctic Programmes do not have a strict legal obligation to remediate the Antarctic environment following human activity. The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the "Madrid Protocol") obliges parties to conduct environmental impact assessments to prevent adverse impacts on the polar environment and to "clean up" pollution from waste disposal sites. The obligations stemming from the Madrid Protocol are not clearly defined, and give potential scope for parties to neglect past sites of human activity on the continent. This scope is narrowed by the work of the Committee for Environmental Protection in implementing clear practical clean-up guidelines for National Antarctic Programmes based on scientific-based recommendations from the Antarctic Treaty Parties. Despite better modern practice, Parties are still faced with damage from past activities. Some of these sites are deemed to be "beyond help." This article proposes that rather than abandoning waste disposal sites because of widely acknowledged difficulties, that National Antarctic Programmes prioritize research into restorative methodologies and techniques, while increasing cooperation with other parties to overcome the enormous logistical and economic costs of cleaning up pollution in Antarctica.

The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is considered a successful example of international governance as it has managed tensions over sovereignty claims, avoided militarisation and dealt with marine resources and environmental protection. Recently, China’s influence and assertiveness in many international institutions have significantly grown. What effect this shift in the international politics will have upon Antarctic governance remains to be seen. However, to further thinking on this issue we explore two current case studies that reveal pressure points within the ATS. First, in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Australia has proposed marine protected areas off East Antarctica, to which China and several other states have objected. Second, in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings, China has proposed special management arrangements for the area around the “Kunlun” station, to which Australia and several other states have objected. Negotiation theory suggests “logrolling” (i.e. trade of mutual decision-making support across issue areas) can be an effective strategy to avoid diplomatic deadlocks. We therefore consider the merits of a logrolling strategy for the above issues. We find that while a logrolling strategy in the ATS might facilitate short-term diplomatic success, it would carry significant risks, including the weakening of existing norms.