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A merican combat experiences since 2001 have revealed stunning military capabilities and repeated tactical successes. Yet the United States has failed to achieve acceptable and durable political arrangements that serve and protect U.S. interests, suggesting that there are fundamental flaws in its approach to modern warfare. The U.S. approach has emphasized existing and largely conventional models and tools, making little accommodation for a changing adversary and its evolution toward nonconventional means. 1 The consequence has been troubled campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq; against the Islamic State; and against various irregular forces in Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere. And the United States is unprepared to contest the nonconventional means being employed by revisionist, revolutionary, and rogue powers, which the U.S. National Security Strategy recognizes as engaged in "fundamentally political contests" employing a blend of political, economic, cyber, and military tools. 2 It is time for the United States to seriously consider developing a capability to orchestrate all relevant elements of U.S. national power in response to these nonconventional threats. An effective response is necessarily a whole-of-government effort and would augment the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) irregular warfare capability, with vital roles for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. Department of State (DoS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and other interagency partners. And such a capability must be able to operate in both war and in peace, with the lead agency dictated by the context. We propose the establishment of an American political warfare capability, with the authorities and knowledge to synchronize all elements of national power in contests with and without armed conflict. The term political warfare is perhaps not ideal, but there is no better, simple term to describe the capability that the United States requires. 3 This American way of political warfare would include both the Cold War version of political warfare, with a focus on the mobilization of all elements of national power in contests

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