As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, formulating targeted policy interventions that are informed by differential severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission dynamics will be of vital importance to national and regional governments. We develop an individual-level model for SARS-CoV-2 transmission that accounts for location-dependent distributions of age, household structure, and comorbidities. We use these distributions together with age-stratified contact matrices to instantiate specific models for Hubei, China; Lombardy, Italy; and New York City, United States. Using data on reported deaths to obtain a posterior distribution over unknown parameters, we infer differences in the progression of the epidemic in the three locations. We also examine the role of transmission due to particular age groups on total infections and deaths. The effect of limiting contacts by a particular age group varies by location, indicating that strategies to reduce transmission should be tailored based on population-specific demography and social structure. These findings highlight the role of between-population variation in formulating policy interventions. Across the three populations, though, we find that targeted “salutary sheltering” by 50% of a single age group may substantially curtail transmission when combined with the adoption of physical distancing measures by the rest of the population.

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Stackelberg security games are a critical tool for maximizing the utility of limited defense resources to protect important targets from an intelligent adversary. Motivated by green security, where the defender may only observe an adversary's response to defense on a limited set of targets, we study the problem of learning a defense that generalizes well to a new set of targets with novel feature values and combinations. Traditionally, this problem has been addressed via a two-stage approach where an adversary model is trained to maximize predictive accuracy without considering the defender's optimization problem. We develop an end-to-end game-focused approach, where the adversary model is trained to maximize a surrogate for the defender's expected utility. We show both in theory and experimental results that our game-focused approach achieves higher defender expected utility than the two-stage alternative when there is limited data.

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A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the followers' best response as constraints in the leader's optimization problem. These reformulation approaches can sometimes be effective, but make limiting assumptions on the followers' objectives and the equilibrium reached by followers, e.g., uniqueness, optimism, or pessimism. To overcome these limitations, we run gradient descent to update the leader's strategy by differentiating through the equilibrium reached by followers. Our approach generalizes to any stochastic equilibrium selection procedure that chooses from multiple equilibria, where we compute the stochastic gradient by back-propagating through a sampled Nash equilibrium using the solution to a partial differential equation to establish the unbiasedness of the stochastic gradient. Using the unbiased gradient estimate, we implement the gradient-based approach to solve three Stackelberg problems with multiple followers. Our approach consistently outperforms existing baselines to achieve higher utility for the leader.