BackgroundThe Illicit Trade Protocol (ITP) requires a global track and trace (T&T) system to reduce tobacco smuggling. Given the tobacco industry’s (TI) historical involvement in tobacco smuggling, it stipulates that T&T ‘shall not be performed by or delegated to the tobacco industry’. This paper explores the rationale for & nature of the TI’s effors to influence the ITP & its T&T system.MethodsAnalysis of leaked TI documents and publicly available data; ,investigation of front groups, trademark and patent ownership.FindingsGrowing & diverse sources of evidence indicate that the TI remains involved in tobacco smuggling and that TI cigarettes account for around two-thirds of the illicit cigarette market. The TI therefore has a vested interest in controlling the global T&T system aimed to curtail this behaviour. To this end, Philip Morris International (PMI) adapted its pack marker system, Codentify, to meet T&T requirements, licensed it for free to its three major competitors who then collectively promoted it to governments using front groups and third parties including companies claiming to be independent despite clear TI links. PMI also sought to suggest Codentify was independent by selling some parts of its intellectual property on Codentify while retaining others, leaving a complex web of shared interests. In Africa, British American Tobacco used payments to obtain data suggesting its smaller competitor companies were evading taxes and secure influence with tax authorities. Regulatory capture has been enhanced by a public relations effort involving TI funding for conferences, training, research, and international police and anti-corruption organisations. Collectively this has created public messaging and a powerful network of organisations supportive of the TI’s misleading postion on illicit.ConclusionsGovernments should assume the TI seeks to control T&T systems in order to avoid scrutiny and minimise excise tax payments and that any T&T system based on Codentify, on intellectual property currently or previously owned by the TI, or being promoted or implemented by companies with TI links, is incompatible with the ITP and would not serve to reduce illicit trade.

BackgroundIn the UK, transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have been arguing that levels of illicit trade are high and increasing and will rise further if standardised packaging is implemented. This paper examines trends in and accuracy of media reporting of, and industry data on, illicit tobacco in the UK.MethodsQuantification of the volume, nature and quality of press articles citing industry data on illicit tobacco in UK newspapers from March 2008 to March 2013. Examination of published TTC data on illicit, including a comparison with independent data and of TTC reporting of Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs data on illicit.ResultsMedia stories citing industry data on illicit tobacco began in June 2011, 2 months after the Tobacco Control Plan for England, which heralded standardised packaging, was published. The majority of data cited are based on industry Empty Pack Surveys for which no methodology is available. For almost all parts of the country where repeat data were cited in press stories, they indicated an increase, often substantial, in non-domestic/illicit cigarettes that is not supported by independent data. Similarly, national data from two published industry sources show a sudden large increase in non-domestic product between 2011 and 2012. Yet the methodology of one report changes over this period and the other provides no published methodology. In contrast, independent data show steady declines in non-domestic and illicit cigarette penetration from 2006 to 2012 and either a continued decline or small increase to 2013.ConclusionsIndustry claims that use of Non-UK Duty Paid/illicit cigarettes in the UK is sharply increasing are inconsistent with historical trends and recent independent data. TTCs are exaggerating the threat of illicit tobacco by commissioning surveys whose methodology and validity remain uncertain, planting misleading stories and misquoting government data. Industry data on levels of illicit should be treated with extreme caution.

BackgroundFollowing a legal agreement with the European Union (EU), Philip Morris International (PMI) commissions a yearly report (‘Project Star’, PS) on the European illicit cigarette trade from KPMG, the global accountancy firm.MethodsReview of PS 2010 report. Comparison with data from independent sources including a 2010 pan-European survey (N=18 056).FindingsWithin PS, data covering all 27 EU countries are entered into a model. While the model itself seems appropriate, concerns are identified with the methodologies underlying the data inputs and thus their quality: there is little transparency over methodologies; interview data underestimate legal non-domestic product partly by failing to account for legal cross-border sales; illicit cigarette estimates rely on tobacco industry empty pack surveys which may overestimate illicit; and there is an over-reliance on data supplied by PMI with inadequate external validation. Thus, PMI sales data are validated using PMI smoking prevalence estimates, yet PMI is unable to provide sales (shipment) data for the Greek islands and its prevalence estimates differ grossly from independent data. Consequently, comparisons with independent data suggest PS will tend to overestimate illicit cigarette levels particularly where cross-border shopping is frequent (Austria, Finland, France) and in Western compared with Eastern European countries. The model also provides data on the nature of the illicit cigarette market independent of seizure data suggesting that almost a quarter of the illicit cigarette market in 2010 comprised PMI's own brands compared with just 5% counterfeited PMI brands; a finding hidden in PMI's public representation of the data.ConclusionsPS overestimates illicit cigarette levels in some European countries and suggests PMI's supply chain control is inadequate. Its publication serves the interests of PMI over those of the EU and its member states. PS requires greater transparency, external scrutiny and use of independent data.