In March, 2018, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) unexpectedly announced that it would re-start negotiations with the United States (US) with regards to nuclear weapons development, signaling an unexpected, but significant, U-turn in its foreign policy. Whilst many academics have put this down to the effect of increased sanctions on the DPRK, I argue that leadership changes in both the US and Republic of Korea (RoK) were the main factor, since these leadership changes brought about foreign policy changes in their respective states. Changes at the system and unit level do not appear to be significant to the DPRK's foreign policy on their own, whereas shifts at the individual level have been more drastic than usual. This allowed the DPRK's leadership to take advantage of the situation, at a point when the US and RoK had domestic disunity. As such, in this paper I analyze the main events at the three major levels; system, unit, and individual levels, using the IR theory of classical realism to support the thesis.

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The Korean peninsula is witnessing historic events and a dramatic improvement in relations between the two Koreas and their allies. However, there must be caution not only over the true intentions of all actors involved, but also the approach taken to the renewed relations must be carefully considered. In the past engagement policies have been tried and failed, whilst the US has committed itself firmly to a pre-condition that the DPRK foregoes its nuclear weapons program and denuclearizes. This paper argues that the US policy is flawed in that the demand of CVID does not create any spillovers for future relations to be bound by, as shown by the 1994 Agreed Framework.As such, an engagement policy should be employed that follows characteristics of West Germany's Ostpolitik in the 1970s and Kim Daejung's Sunshine Policy.WHAT COMES FIRST, DENUCLEARIZATION OR PEACE? 660 straight forward, having also endured a bumpy journey to get there. The sudden cancellation of the summit by President Trump in late May was due to various reasons, although one reason that stood above all others was the policies of the parties regarding denuclearization of the Korean peninsula-the US following its policy of CVID and the North following its policy of maintaining a nuclear deterrent. This paper will look at the two different approaches to the Korean problem and analyze whether an approach of engagement that develops trust and, through spillovers, leads to peace and eventual denuclearization is more productive, or whether an aggressive unilateral stance demanding full denuclearization from the start is preferable. This paper concerns itself primarily with the idea of using spillovers, and hence the first section will define what spillovers are and also how spillovers can be separated into positive and negative spillovers. The following section will take a closer look at how engagement can produce positive spillovers, namely by studying the rapprochement policy of Willy Brandt in the early 1970s and the more recent Sunshine Policy in Korea in the 1990s and early 2000s. The next section will analyze the US policy of CVID and its likelihood of producing either no spillovers or negative spillovers, using examples of failed attempts at denuclearization, such as the 1994 Agreed Framework.This paper aims to expand the discourse on the question of denuclearization by utilizing the current situation on the Korean peninsula to advocate a diplomatic approach of integrative engagement, rather than unilateral force. The literature to date focuses mainly on whether denuclearization should happen or not, and fails to analyze how denuclearization should be brought about. By analyzing examples such as Ostpolitik this paper will show that engagement can foster relations leading to peaceful co-existence and cooperation, even if denuclearization is not achieved.

Détente is sweeping across the Korean Peninsula for the first time in over a decade following policies of engagement by both the North and South. How long and successful this détente will be is yet to be seen, however, it has once again sparked calls for reunification. Whilst the reunification of the two Koreas has been well-discussed most literature and discussions follow the same ideas; absorption of the North into the South and discussions on the economic and political repercussions. This paper, on the other hand, analyses the social divide between the two Koreas suggesting that it is reaching a point of inelasticity, namely a point where if the divide stretches even further the two peoples will never be able to successfully reunite, regardless of how reunification occurs. As such, in the case of a German-like, "surprise reunification" the governments must prepare a social reunification policy in advance.