Existing evidence has demonstrated that sanctions affect unemployment payment recipients’ behaviour. However, in addition to financial impacts, sanction application includes administrative processes. This study examines a feature of Australian unemployment benefits, whereby jobseekers not meeting requirements may face a zero‐dollar sanction (termed suspension). The results indicate a strong behavioural response, with previously suspended jobseekers 13.1 percentage points more likely to attend their next appointment. Further, ongoing behavioural change was observed, even for jobseekers with a history of previous non‐compliance. This suggests temporary payment suspension and associated administrative processes are effective at securing behavioural change, without the need for lasting financial impact.

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After 12 months of unemployment, Australian benefit recipients must undertake intensive participation in activities, in addition to standard requirements. Advocacy groups have raised concerns that these requirements are too onerous. If this were the case, those with additional requirements would be expected to comply less, and more often have a valid reason for non‐compliance. We examine this claim using discontinuities in levels of requirements. We do not find evidence of higher rates of non‐compliance or valid reason. However, further research is required to determine how to optimally set requirements, including further research on the efficacy of the requirements themselves.