We claim that abduction should primarily be studied from the perspective of its use. The big question "What is abduction?" is most often interpreted substantively and this distracts attention from the instrumental aspect of this form of reasoning. We propose to address the problem by asking "How abduction is used?". As a result of our approach we see the fact that abduction needs to be construed as concerned with both generation and evaluation of hypotheses, and, furthermore, that abduction is a compound form of reasoning.

While the preparatory neural mechanisms of real and imagined body movements have been extensively studied, the underpinnings of self-initiated, voluntary mental acts are largely unknown. Therefore, using electroencephalography (EEG), we studied the time course and patterns of changes in brain activity associated with purely mental processes which start on their own, without an external or interoceptive stimulation. We compared EEG recordings for decisions to perform mental operations on numbers, imagined finger movements, and actual finger movements. In all three cases, we found striking similarities in slow negative shifts of brain electrical activity lasting around 1 s and, therefore, characteristic for readiness potential. These results show that the brain not only needs time to be ready for a purely mental task but also that a required preparatory interval involves neural changes analogical to the ones observed before intentional body movements. As such, the readiness potential represents a universal process of unconscious preparatory brain activity preceding any, including purely mental, voluntary action.

It is well known that Husserl clearly recognized the importance of the introduction of idealization in physics and its contribution to the further advancement in natural sciences. The history of the successful applications of idealization in natural sciences encouraged attempts to extend the use of this sophisticated instrument of theoretical investigation and theory construction to other domains of science. Since Husserl designed his phenomenology as the rigorous science of consciousness we have to find out why he did not use the method he understood so well to study experiences, the objects located by him in the domain of consciousness. The paper offers an answer to this question. It explains why Husserl conceived of the method of idealization as a tool of objectivization of previously subjective knowledge. Since idealization is used to objectify knowledge its application to experiences, conscious acts would produce objective knowledge of consciousness. This, however, would contradict phenomenological assertion that subjectivity is an essential component of experience and that the reliable knowledge about conscious acts could not be objectified. It is the core of Husserl's argumentation that there is no place for idealization in the research on consciousness.

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