We consider a class of Nash games, termed as aggregative games, being played over a networked system. In an aggregative game, a player's objective is a function of the aggregate of all the players' decisions. Every player maintains an estimate of this aggregate, and the players exchange this information with their local neighbors over a connected network. We study distributed synchronous and asynchronous algorithms for information exchange and equilibrium computation over such a network. Under standard conditions, we establish the almost-sure convergence of the obtained sequences to the equilibrium point. We also consider extensions of our schemes to aggregative games where the players' objectives are coupled through a more general form of aggregate function. Finally, we present numerical results that demonstrate the performance of the proposed schemes.

In a recent paper, a distributed algorithm was proposed for solving linear algebraic equations of the form Ax = b assuming that the equation has at least one solution. The equation is presumed to be solved by m agents assuming that each agent knows a subset of the rows of the matrix [ A b ], the current estimates of the equation's solution generated by each of its neighbors, and nothing more. Neighbor relationships are represented by a time-dependent directed graph N(t) whose vertices correspond to agents and whose arcs characterize neighbor relationships. Sufficient conditions on N(t) were derived under which the algorithm can cause all agents' estimates to converge exponentially fast to the same solution to Ax = b. These conditions were also shown to be necessary for exponential convergence, provided the data about [ A b ] available to the agents is "non-redundant". The aim of this paper is to relax this "non-redundant" assumption. This is accomplished by establishing exponential convergence under conditions which are the weakest possible for the problem at hand; the conditions are based on a new notion of graph connectivity. An improved bound on the convergence rate is also derived.

We study a model of collective real-time decision-making (or learning) in a social network operating in an uncertain environment, for which no a priori probabilistic model is available. Instead, the environment's impact on the agents in the network is seen through a sequence of cost functions, revealed to the agents in a causal manner only after all the relevant actions are taken. There are two kinds of costs: individual costs incurred by each agent and local-interaction costs incurred by each agent and its neighbors in the social network. Moreover, agents have inertia: each agent has a default mixed strategy that stays fixed regardless of the state of the environment, and must expend effort to deviate from this strategy in order to respond to cost signals coming from the environment. We construct a decentralized strategy, wherein each agent selects its action based only on the costs directly affecting it and on the decisions made by its neighbors in the network. In this setting, we quantify social learning in terms of regret, which is given by the difference between the realized network performance over a given time horizon and the best performance that could have been achieved in hindsight by a fictitious centralized entity with full knowledge of the environment's evolution. We show that our strategy achieves the regret that scales polylogarithmically with the time horizon and polynomially with the number of agents and the maximum number of neighbors of any agent in the social network.