The African continent has been consistent in placing its concerns regarding the manner in which international criminal justice is administered on the international platform. For the past decade, the continent has minced no words about its misgivings concerning the use of universal jurisdiction (UJ) by both foreign States and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The African Union (AU) has been very supportive of UJ and its utility in fighting impunity and affording justice to victims of the core crimes of international law, namely, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Often referred to as core crimes, these are regarded as customary law crimes which are an affront to entire humankind. These crimes were also codified by the Rome Statute of the ICC. However, the political and selective use of the principle of universality by foreign States to prosecute perpetrators of these crimes was seen as causing conflicts and undermining peace efforts, reconciliation and regional stability. As a result the African continent voiced its concerns at various public platforms, including under the auspices of the UN and it therefore called for reforms. This prompted the AU to produce its own model law on UJ, which African States could adapt to their own socio-political circumstances and legal context. The debates that ensued around UJ on the African continent offered African States a chance to contribute to the development of international law, especially on the rules concerning UJ. This paper analyses the interaction amongst African states that eventually led to the development of UJ regulations within their individual legal systems, and tries to determine if there is indeed an African signature in those legal rules.

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In late 2016, the Constitutional Court delivered judgment in a case, Wickham v Magistrate, Stellenbosch 2017 1 BCLR 121 (CC), involving Wayne Anthony Wickham (an aggrieved father and applicant in this case), who appealed against the decision of the Magistrate's Court in which he was denied the opportunity to hand up a victim impact statement. The thrust of his application was that his rights, as a victim of the crime in which his son was negligently killed by the fourth respondent, had been violated, and that this raised an arguable point of law of general public importance. The respondents, however, argued that the applicant lacked standing as the dominus litis in culpable homicide cases is the public prosecutor, and not the relatives of the deceased, or the victim. The case turned on whether the exercise of discretion by the Magistrate in denying Wickham the right to be heard was performed correctly; and whether a non-party to criminal proceedings could make an application for the review of the Magistrate's conduct. The article seeks to interrogate the rights of victims in criminal proceedings and aptly poses the following question: Do victims of crimes have a locus standi to be part of criminal proceedings?

On 16 September 2016, the Swaziland High Court delivered judgment in the matter between Maseko and others v Prime Minister of Swaziland and others [2016] SZHC 180, in which it declared certain provisions of the Suppression of terrorism Act (2008); and the Sedition and Subversive Activities Act (1938) as unconstitutional. The Declaration followed a constitutional challenge, based on the applicants' freedom of expression, assembly and association. The judgment was unprecedented in the Swaziland context, given that of the four applicants, three were political activists and one was a Human Rights lawyer. All four have been in frequent collision with the government over their political opinions. Two judges ruled in favour of the applicants, whilst the third one ruled against them. The judgment was a sharp departure from past decisions, where the courts often ruled in favour of the state, leaving many litigants without a remedy. The ruling marked the first time a Swazi court had declared the Swaziland Constitution a living document. However commendable the main judgment, the dissenting opinion raises several constitutional questions that need to be addressed. This article therefore, critically analyses the dissenting opinion of Justice Hlophe, and seeks to demonstrate that his approach is antithetical to constitutionalism, and is irreconcilable with accepted notions of Bill of Rights litigation.

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