Analysing the handling of the pandemic's first phase in Greece, the article attempts to explain the reasons for its relative success. It suggests four main reasons: First, the predominance of evidence-informed policymaking led by strong and decisive leadership. Second, a timely and firm crisis response, driven by the prior experience of other European countries with the pandemic. Third, the public sector's digital turn and a tight scheme of intra-government coordination. Fourth, a transparent and effective communication strategy signalling that public health was a priority, which subsequently led to high citizen compliance with the restrictive measures. The second phase of the pandemic is also discussed to nuance this claim and show that the long duration of the crisis brought new challenges to its management. The article provides insights into how countries with limited resources and weak administrative capacity can effectively manage such crises.

The debate surrounding a potential BrEXiT has largely focused on the costs and disadvantages for Britain of making such a move. However, Britain leaving the Eu would also alter the strengths and profile of the European union. Britain is the Eu's second largest economy, a significant net contributor to the Eu budget, hosts Europe's only global financial centre and is an important driver of single market reform on the European stage.

The European Union (EU) studies literature has not engaged much with instances in which the European Commission exhibited dysfunctional and pathological behaviour. The paper employs a least likely case to suggest that the Commission might adopt such behaviour even under adverse circumstances. It examines the Commission's public opposition to a private sector involvement scheme for Greece in 2011, despite member states and investors favouring such an option. This stance exacerbated financial instability, proving detrimental for the Commission's stated crisis‐management goals. By using qualitative material, including 10 elite interviews, the paper attributes this behaviour to the Commission's pro‐integration culture as historically interpreted in the context of financial crises. This led the Commission to universalise inefficient policies whilst being insulated from external feedback. The study offers insights on when the Commission adopts dysfunctional behaviour whilst providing a novel angle on its role in EU integration.