Purpose A whole series of food scandals indicates that misdirected incentives continue to be a source of food risks. Lacking market transparency and the opportunistic use of seemingly profitable opportunities to break the rules cause negative externalities and failure of markets. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of mandatory transparency schemes on food businesses’ behavioural drivers and thus on compliance. Design/methodology/approach The authors use an adopted analytical framework developed by Hirschauer et al. (2012) as the theoretical background. The authors provide an empirical analysis of the effects of a disclosure system on businesses’ behavioural drivers in three urban parts of the German capital Berlin. The authors conducted a pen-and-paper survey among food businesses to collect data and used a generalized ordered logit regression model to analyse them. Findings The results show that the higher the businesses assess the possible negative effects of a negative smiley on sales, the higher the probability of compliance. Considering the immaterial behavioural drivers (protective factors) the authors find the statistical significant influence of a feeling of embarrassment in case of disclosure and the feeling of a fair evaluation on compliance. Thus, the study supports the expectation that disclosure policies affect behavioural drivers and have the potential to steer food businesses’ compliance. Practical implications The study supports the expectation that hygiene controls’ disclosure positively affects food businesses’ compliance. These findings should be taken into consideration in the ongoing discussion about disclosure. Nowadays, there is no mandatory transparency in Germany due to a strong opposition from businesses and their lobbying groups. Originality/value The authors conducted a pen-and-paper survey among food businesses in three urban districts of the German capital Berlin, namely, Pankow, Lichtenberg and Marzahn-Hellersdorf in 2014. The food authorities in these districts were the only ones in Germany that had introduced and run a mandatory disclosure system (smiley-system) for food businesses. The results of the inspections were published on the authorities’ homepages in the internet, and were displayed in businesses. Thus the data mirror the unique experiences of the only German food businesses that participated in a mandatory transparency scheme.

In this article we explore how variables associated both with material temptations (economic incentives that foster rule breaking) and nonmaterial behavioral determinants (protective factors that shield people from rule breaking) are linked to compliance with food laws. The object of the study is to examine food businesses in the ready‐to‐eat industry in three districts of the German capital, Berlin. We collected data on compliance behavior and its potential drivers via an anonymous postal survey in 2014. Accounting for the data structure, we used a generalized ordered logit regression to model the relationship between the presumed behavioral drivers and compliance. One crucial finding is that a feeling of embarrassment if relevant others were to learn about noncompliance is positively related to compliance. The same holds for the internalized approval of food laws and their enforcement (acceptance of rules).

The decision-making behavior of individuals is limited by a lack of information and a limited capacity to process information. When seeking locations to construct a hive, the honeybee Apis mellifera collectively succeeds at overcoming these individual limitations and, thus, arrives at (nearly) optimal decisions. This article examines the behaviors and coordination mechanisms that have reinforced this trait in the course of evolution. We consider what lessons might be learned concerning human behavior and how better decisions can be made.

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Our paper explores how participants of voluntary transparency systems react to the cancellation of such programmes. We concern ourselves with participants of the voluntary transparency scheme known as the "North Rhine-Westphalia Smiley". The Smiley system, which awarded the compliant behavior of businesses that joined it, was established in 2007 but cancelled in 2013 due to lack of participants. In our survey, the vast majority of the respondents express regret at the cancellation of the scheme. The goals of this paper are to (i) econometrically explain how sociodemographic, monetary, and non-monetary determinants influence participants' willingness to continue with the voluntary transparency system and (ii) find reasons for the inconsistency between the lack of participants and the expression of regret within our survey. We find evidence that the non-monetary variables "revenue" and "award" and the monetary variable "revenue" influence participants' regret. We speculate that status quo bias and loss aversion are the reasons why businesses favour maintaining the Smiley scheme once they have experienced it.