Purpose The purpose of this study is a comparison of anti-insider trading regulations in the European Union (EU) and in Brazil. Design/methodology/approach The subject of the comparison are three key elements that define the shape of the protection against insider trading, namely, the definition of inside information, the definition of insiders and the kinds of behaviours that are forbidden. Findings There are both differences and similarities between EU and Brazilian legislations on insider trading. The main discrepancies found in the three foci of the analysis seem to relate strongly to the different rationales for the prohibition of insider trading adopted in the two legal systems. In the EU, market egalitarianism and thus the parity of information, are the central concepts, whereas fiduciary duties originally constituted the point of reference in Brazil, although it has been losing importance over time owing to subsequent changes in the legislation. In sum, while anti-insider trading regulations in the EU have a well-defined identity, in Brazil their policy basis seems to be in the process of redefinition. Originality/value As of the time of submission of this study no published academic works dedicated substantially to a comparison of the anti-insider trading legislation of the EU and Brazil could be found.

Inspiracją do zbadania charakteru sankcji, jakie prawodawcy innych krajów przewidzieli w odpowiedzi na naruszenie zakazu manipulacji instrumentami fi nansowymi, była, generalizując, negatywna ocena decyzji w tym przedmiocie podjętej przez polskiego prawodawcę, dokonana w monografi i "Kryminalizacja manipulacji instrumentami fi nansowymi" 2 . W pracy tej zawarty był wprawdzie rozdział odnoszący się do regulacji prawnych obowiązujących w Wielkiej Brytanii, Niemczech oraz Stanach Zjednoczonych, czyli krajach posiadających wysoko rozwinięte rynki kapitałowe, jednak rozważania te służyły przede wszystkim pokazaniu różnych sposobów defi niowania manipulacji. Natomiast dla oceny charakteru sankcji, która grozi sprawcy manipulacji, taka perspektywa była zbyt skromna.1 Studium powstało dzięki stypendium uzyskanemu w lipcu 2012 r. w Instytucie Maxa Planca dla Prawa Karnego Zagranicznego i Międzynarodowego (Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht) we Fryburgu Bryzgowijskim (Niemcy).2 A. Błachnio-Parzych, Kryminalizacja manipulacji instrumentami fi nansowymi, Warszawa 2011.

O sistema punitivo na Polônia é complicado. Inclui a responsabilidade por crimes, contravenções, crimes fiscais e contravenções fiscais. Além disso, existem infrações administrativas que podem acarretar sanções muito severas. Seu número tem aumentado desde a década de 1990 e agora desempenham um papel importante como um sistema alternativo de investigação e sanção. Elas pertencem formalmente ao direito administrativo, mas sua análise do ponto de vista dos critérios de ‘acusação criminal’ desenvolvidos na jurisprudência do TEDH permite tratá-las como parte do direito penal sensu largissimo. Portanto, essa forma responsabilidade também é chamada de responsabilidade administrativo-criminal. Levanta-se, então, a questão da conformidade das normas relativas à responsabilidade administrativo-criminal, pertencentes ao direito administrativo, com as principais garantias do direito penal. O objetivo do artigo é apresentar o caráter geral da responsabilidade administrativo-criminal e avaliar as regras introduzidas em 2017 na perspectiva de algumas salvaguardas voltadas especificamente à responsabilidade criminal.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the institution of the concurrent and the consecutive sentences in the English criminal law. The differences between them are based on the way they are executed and on the premises which courts take into consideration. Generally, the concurrent sentences are imposed for offences which arose out of a single act and therefore the terms of imprisonment shall run at the same time (concurrently). However, a deeper analysis of the literature and the case law of the English courts leads to the conclusion that the differences between them are not so important, because the main role plays the totality principle. It changes the way the institution of the concurrent and the consecutive sentences shall be perceived.

Market Manipulation is sometimes labeled as a "virtual term of art". This expression shows how difficult it is to define what kind of market practices are market manipulation. This difficulty is strictly connected with the issue of legislative decisions what behavior should be treated as manipulation. The problem derives from the thin border between aggressive but legal behavior and market manipulation. To determine the border one should not forget that the essence of functioning of capital markets is speculation, which I understand as a rational behavior of market participants.One aim of this contribution is to show how the EU legislator coped with the challenge in the Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation. The EU legislator assumed that the most effective way to combat market manipulation was to define it in an objective way. It raises the question whether it is possible to define manipulation this way-and whether the EU legislator succeeded.The second section of this chapter focuses on current draft EU regulations against market manipulation. The EU Commission, after public consultation on the review of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) (Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ L96/16), tabled evaluations of contemporary regulations against market manipulation. The lack of clarity and thus legal certainty was pointed as one of the main disadvantages of the existing framework. Therefore, this warrants the question whether the EU commission proposals for a new framework solve the problem of legal clarity and legal certainty.A. Blachnio-Parzych (*)