Highlights Integration policies are often seen as strategies to reduce avoidable hospital activity. “New care models” were piloted in England under the “Vanguard” initiative. We evaluate the efficacy of the Vanguard programme in reducing hospital utilisation. The Vanguard initiative slowed the rise in emergency admissions observed in England. The reduction occurred mainly in care home sites, at the programme’s end.

AbstractThe English NHS is currently organised around a split between the ‘commissioning’ and the ‘providing’ of health care. There has been considerable critical comment about commissioning, focusing upon perceived inadequacies of the regulatory structure and a perceived lack of competence of the managers concerned. In this paper, we use empirical data from two detailed studies of commissioning to propose a third explanation of the difficulties that have been observed in making commissioning work. We apply Scott's institutional analysis to the issue, arguing that far from reflecting managerial incompetence, some of the difficulties experienced are inherent in the normative and cultural/cognitive pillars of the NHS institution, so that there is a lack of ‘fit’ between commissioning and the institutional characteristics of the NHS. We conclude by exploring the potential impact of the latest round of NHS changes on this institution.

Objective One of the key goals of the current reforms in the English National Health Service (NHS) under the Health and Social Care Act, 2012, is to increase the accountability of those responsible for commissioning care for patients (clinical commissioning groups (CCGs)), while at the same time allowing them a greater autonomy. This study was set out to explore CCG's developing accountability relationships. Design We carried out detailed case studies in eight CCGs, using interviews, observation and documentary analysis to explore their multiple accountabilities. Setting/participants We interviewed 91 people, including general practitioners, managers and governing body members in developing CCGs, and undertook 439 h of observation in a wide variety of meetings. Results CCGs are subject to a managerial, sanction-backed accountability to NHS England (the highest tier in the new organisational hierarchy), alongside a number of other external accountabilities to the public and to some of the other new organisations created by the reforms. In addition, unlike their predecessor commissioning organisations, they are subject to complex internal accountabilities to their members. Conclusions The accountability regime to which CCGs are subject to is considerably more complex than that which applied their predecessor organisations. It remains to be seen whether the twin aspirations of increased autonomy and increased accountability can be realised in practice. However, this early study raises some important issues and concerns, including the risk that the different bodies to whom CCGs are accountable will have differing (or conflicting) agendas, and the lack of clarity over the operation of sanction regimes.

ConclusionCCGs are new organisations, faced with significant new responsibilities. This study provides early evidence of issues that CCGs and those responsible for CCG development may wish to address.

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