Is the implementation of power-sharing provisions the key to durable peace? This study analyzes whether the implementation of political, military, and territorial power-sharing provisions contributes to peace. We introduce a new dataset (IMPACT), which contains unique information on the implementation of power-sharing pacts in peace accords in the post—Cold War period. Based on the logic of costly signaling, we demonstrate that when the parties engage in costly concessions by implementing military and territorial provisions, peace is more likely to prevail. In contrast, the implementation of political pacts is less costly, and hence does not increase the prospects of peace.

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In this article, we suggest that taking a relational view of peace seriously is a fruitful avenue for expanding current theoretical frameworks surrounding peace as a concept. Paving the way for such an approach, this article conducts a review of the literature that takes on peace as a relational concept. We then return to how a relationship is conceptualized, before turning to how such components would be further defined in order to specify relational peace. Based on this framework, we argue that a peaceful relationship entails deliberation, non-domination, and cooperation between the actors in the dyad; the actors involved recognize and trust each other and believe that the relationship is either one between legitimate fellows or one between friends. The article clarifies the methodological implications of studying peace in this manner. It also demonstrates some of the advantages of this approach, as it shows how peace and war can coexist in webs of multiple interactions, and the importance of studying relations, and how actors understand these relationships, as a way of studying varieties of peace.