The presented study is multi-disciplinary in nature. It combines elements of legal analysis, political science, as well as elements of the science of safety. This multi-faceted study has allowed us to not only to cover a wide field of research but also to make thorough descriptions and explanations provided sense largissimo. The text concerns the multi-faceted relationship between legality and the legitimacy of law in the perspective of international and national dimensions. The authors concluded that “justice” (as a rule and also a value) is a (different) Grundnorm in international law. The authors discuss the role of the international community, the principle of sovereignty and the essence of nomocracy, in shaping and changing the scope of the legitimacy of law.

The social order, and especially the legal order, is implemented and maintained by institutions whose actions are based on the application of various forms of legal constraint. A sanction in the law may take various forms, as diversified in content may be the legislative justifications for them. The article deals with reflection on sanctions. It begins with a linguistic note: "sanction" as a semantic category and a term from juristic language. Then in the theory of law as an element of the structure of the norm. Authors also point out that sanctions exist in normative systems other than the law and they start reasoning by citing the view that the most important goal of establishing sanctions is to prompt adequate motivation of the subjects to comply with the norm (legal or other). In the essential part of the article the authors refer the division and typology of sanctions and theirs construction. In the final and most important part of the article the classical point of view-quoted at the beginning-is confronted with the order of international law, which is sometimes recognized as as lex imperfecta-as the international public law (law of nations) hasn't developed a system of institutionalized sanctions ensuring observance of its norms. The authors suggest that it is a mistake committed the most frequently by lawyers not expert in international public law unjustifiably and incorrectly transfer the apparatus of notions with precisely assigned significance straight from the theory of domestic (in this case, Polish) law into the sphere of research on public international law. For the international law is shaped as a decentralized structure, within which the question of the execution of behaviours complying with its principles and rules belong to the duties of the subjects of that law-members of international society. The effectiveness, efficiency and purposefulness of the law is not completely

The state, under the Westphalian order, was both the creator and product of international law which determined its position as the central actor of this system. The norms of international law defined the normative content of the internal security regime, where state security was identical with security as such in international relations. The reality that laid the foundation for this logical syllogism has been subject to gradual transformation that had its climax in the early decades of the 21st century. The states, previously holding monopoly of using force in international relations, which allowed for prevention of wars by means of intergovernmental agreements or maintenance of peace through institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation, lost their exclusive authority to use force. Stipulating ‘non-war’ by means of an (intergovernmental) international treaty became impossible since the non-state actors who apply force pursue counter-systemic goals and reject the international (and internal) order based on the rule of law. The state sovereignty, whose significant albeit not exclusive referent was autocracy and total power, has been transformed from the title of claim to cease the violation by the state into the personal right to protection (vested in an individual or minority/people/mankind in general). International law, which did not constitute a system until as late as the second half of the 20th century, not only obtained such character relatively quickly, but also has been subject to constitutionalization. The inherent unity of the international law as the common legal system of the international community is subject, along with this community, to fundamental divergence: into the law governing (internal) relationships between members of the, transatlantic, security community, which form a normatively and institutionally interrelated selfcontained regime on the one hand, and the international law that governs the relations between the countries of the Western Hemisphere and other subjects of the international law on the other hand. These factors determine the shift of the security paradigm: new actors, new normative content, different binding effect of the norms and, above all, new rules. The new paradigm of security in the international law dimension correlates with the shift in metaphors that build concepts significant to the international law such as state, sovereignty, security, and international treaty. These transformations set the stage for the legitimization of actions taken by the subjects of legal protection in the international law dimension.

Considering the pluralism of the axiological sources of human rights, we claim that it is necessary to realize that we are facing at the moment an analytic extension of both the “number” of human rights (appearance of new generations of human rights), as well as the “quantitative quality” of human rights due to newly uncovered axiological sources such as the appearance of new values or a redefinition of existing ones. In the presented context of the axiology of human rights and the axiology of their protection, it is easy to observe the axiological pluralism of the two spheres as well as numerous attempts to make the exegesis and interpretation both relative and instrumental1 in a domestic, European, and international sphere. Attempts to limit human rights in a camouflaged manner in the jurisdiction practice of particular states are quite abundant and an axiological justification of legal solutions that would make the implementation and protection of those rights (in particular those of the third, fourth and fifth generations) ineffectual—de facto (not de iure, since from a formal and legal point of view they correspond to declared rights and, without exception, the protected ones) is the guarantee of community security and, paradoxically, the protection of other people (i.e., the protection of religious sentiments, family, public morality based usually on the rules of the dominant religion). When transposing these problematics from the state perspective to the intra- and trans-state level, we need to demonstrate that in the international law of protection of human rights, limitation of these rights may also take place as a result of extra-normative factors due to so-called “instrumental relativism”, applied in the function of current political interests for which intrinsic human dignity happens to be infringed. We also claim that the active factor of that critical crossing point is not faults in the law or its interpretation, nor is it faults of ethics, but rather the faults of what is going on within so-called Realpolitik.

The aim of the study was to answer the question whether there are universal norms of customary international law governing the immunity of international organisations and their property and address the obstacles to the development of the UN Convention governing the immunity of international organisations. Through comparative legal analysis, the Author proves that state immunities result from international and national laws. In the case of immunities derived from international law, there are no universal standards defining the scope of the jurisdiction immunity of a state and its property. Jurisdictional immunity of international organisations has as its only source international law (many states also regulate the issue in their domestic law). The study showed that international regulations move in contradictory directions: as regards the states, there is a move away from absolute immunity, while for international organisations the expansion of the catalogue of authorized immunity and its scope is observed.