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The paper is primarily concerned with solving the problem if the supporters of the thesis “omnia incerta” in Luc. 32 are Arcesilaus and his followers. The argument “omnia incerta” has paradoxical consequences for the conduct of life since it implies the charge of inactivity. The reply points out that is not the sceptic’s fault if everything is uncertain as whether the stars are even or odd in number. This answer is unfit to face the charge of apraxia. The distinction between “what is uncertain” and “what cannot perceived” tries to refute the objection that everything is uncertain, putting forward the probable presentation and showing that in the absence of knowledge we are not left entirely without a standard. But if this is so, the philosophy of Carneades, and not of Arcesilaus, can answer to the “omnia incerta” objection. This implies that the argument that “the wise man will never opine”, put forward by Arcesilaus, needs to be reinterpreted, as is clear from Cicero’s Lucullus

Charles Brittain: Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Sceptics. Oxford: Oxford UP 2001. XII, 406 S. (Oxford classical monographs.) 40 £.