This paper focuses on Hungary’s illiberal regimes from the perspective of the opposition – a perspective we believe has been under-scrutinized so far. It argues that in order to understand the regime’s success it is crucial to explain why opposition parties have been unable to offer a credible alternative. The paper argues that the opposition is in a trap with three unfavourable factors mutually strengthening each other and undermining its ability for success. They are (1) the cartel party system; (2) the weak social embeddedness of opposition parties; and (3) lack of their presence in local politics. At the same time, we also point out that the rise of a tiny joke-party’s success (The Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party) highlights that these obstacles can be overcome even with very limited resources. Nevertheless, it is still unclear if the Dog Party’s innovative approach to doing politics could be ‘institutionalized’ – i.e. if it offers a feasible model strategy for opposition parties – or it is only an efficient way of mocking and criticizing how the political system operates.

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The article analyzes the political discourse concerning direct democracy between 1985–89, when the issue of introducing popular vote at local and national level became relevant, both as a general institutional reform of political decision-making, and as the result of some major initiatives launched by social movements. The analysis covers the related law journal articles, party-state documents, the writings of political and intellectual elites (including the opposition), and the wider public (mainly daily and weekly newspapers). The discourse analysis is based on the academic literature of direct democracy and some new aspects, like the timing of introducing direct democracy, its role and perspectives, the consideration of threats and benefits, and the relevance of international examples as possible models for reform. The paper finds that the opposition and the party-state regarded the introduction of popular vote differently: while the emerging opposition emphasised the function of controling the state power by popular votes, the party-state expected to stop shrinking its social legitimacy. Meanwhile, general public seemed to be indifferent about this remarkable democratic reform.

This article connects Böröcz's (2021) Eurowhiteness concept with a critical dissection of Western European academia's stance on ‘outsiders’, including Eastern Europeans and non‐Europeans. It explains how an exclusivist Western science is created, where, behind the seemingly open and diverse environment, we find monolithic privileges helping participants inside and blocking participation from the outside. The article claims that in the present Western European academic setting, there are two tendencies that seriously harm diversity and the free flow of ideas. First, Western scholarly communities boost their potential through structural advantage. In this environment, scientific excellence becomes a form of privilege. However, it does not necessarily mean proper excellence, but more an exclusionary system of greater financial assets, personal connections, and shared knowhow among the participants, as well as access to gatekeepers. Second, the article uses Cass R. Sunstein's theory on sludge in public management to explain how the European Union boosts this phenomenon with its inequitable ways of allocating research funding: this is how privilege escalation is created through a pseudo‐meritocratic system. Finally, the article explains how Eastern European scholars adhered to these requirements with a self‐colonizing attitude, which limits their long‐term capability to carry out original science.