Participation in intensive training programs for the unemployed in Germany is allocated by awarding training vouchers. Using rich administrative data for all vouchers and actual program participation, the authors provide first estimates of the short-run and long-run employment and earnings effects of receiving a training voucher award based on a selection-on-observables assumption. The results imply that, after the award, voucher recipients experience long periods of lower labor market success compared to had they not received training vouchers. Small positive employment effects and no gains in earnings were observed four to seven years after the receipt of the voucher award. In addition, the findings suggest stronger positive effects both for all low-skilled individuals who were awarded and redeemed a voucher and for low-skilled and medium-skilled individuals who chose to take degree courses than for higher-skilled recipients.

We conduct a field experiment with sellers of home improvement services on two German online markets. We take the role of consumers and vary whether we request an invoice for the delivery of the service. In a market that allows anyone to sell anonymously, a willingness to evade is prevalent. In a market that keeps track of credentials, sellers are only willing to evade when a willingness to collude is signaled. The evasion discount is in most estimates not larger than the tax subsidy for legal demand. Evasion is unlikely to be beneficial for many consumers in our setting. (JEL C93, H25, H26, L84)

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract