We explore how banks transmit central bank liquidity injections using unique variation in the ECB’s 2011-12 Very Long-Term Refinancing Operations (VLTROs) which affected lending to firms discontinuously across credit ratings (i.e., within banks). We show that banks transmit liquidity differently to multi-bank firms than to firms with only one bank. Single-bank firms receive longer-term relationship lending and increase investment, while multi-bank firms receive short-term transactions-style lending only. Policy effects are attributable to increasing the maturity of bank borrowing from the ECB in combination with allowing banks to use loans to firms as collateral for such borrowing.

We explore how banks transmit central bank liquidity injections using unique variation in the ECB's 2011-12 Very Long-Term Refinancing Operations (VLTROs) which affected lending to firms discontinuously across credit ratings (i.e., within banks). We show that banks transmit liquidity differently to multi-bank firms than to firms with only one bank. Single-bank firms receive longer-term relationship lending and increase investment, while multi-bank firms receive short-term transactions-style lending only. Policy effects are attributable to increasing the maturity of bank borrowing from the ECB in combination with allowing banks to use loans to firms as collateral for such borrowing.

This paper documents that monetary policy affects credit supply through banks' cost of funding. Using administrative credit-registry and regulatory bank data, we find that banks can incur an increase in their funding costs of at least 30 basis points before they adjust their lending. For identification, we exploit the existence of regulated-deposit accounts in France whose interest rates are set by the government and are, thus, not directly affected by the monetary-policy rate. When banks' funding cost increases and they contract their lending, we observe portfolio reallocations consistent with risk shifting: banks that depend on regulated deposits lend less to large firms, and relatively more to small firms and entrepreneurs. 4

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