Objectives Contributions to candidates from the parties’ congressional campaign committees are thought to have a “multiplier effect” in terms of generating contributions from political action committees. Method Using structural equation modeling and timed direct contribution data from the 1992 to 2012 general election cycles, I uncover a complex system of relationships within each party network. Results After controlling for the competitiveness of the race, I find party contributions to challengers and open‐seat contestants early in the election cycle positively and significantly predict political action committee contributions to those candidates in the period after Labor Day, both in the era preceding the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act and the era after reform; however, the strength of the relationship declines in the postreform era and differences between the party networks also arise. Conclusions I attribute these developments to changes in campaign finance law that created new hurdles for parties and increased the influence of interest groups.

Objective. As incumbent House members increasingly recruit campaign contributions from individuals who reside outside of their districts, this raises the question of whether a dependency on outside money affects members' responsiveness and ideological proximity to district constituents. Method. Using data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies of 2006, 2008, and 2010 as well as individual contribution data corresponding to those years from the U.S. Federal Election Commission, I examine this relationship using responsiveness and proximity models of representation. Results. I find a dependency on outside contributions decreases members' responsiveness to their districts and increases the members' ideological extremity. Moreover, within-district contributions only minimally improve ideological alignment between the member and the district. Conclusion.

Non-incumbents face an uphill battle in their quest to raise sufficient funds to compete effectively against seated House incumbents and, alternatively, in competitive open-seat House contests. Interest group endorsements are thought to contribute to their electoral success, but whether endorsements help non-incumbent House candidates raise contributions from individuals, as a component of this success, remains unknown. Their heavy reliance upon individual contributions to finance their campaigns as well as the prominence of the groups making a large number of endorsements justifies an explicit test of this relationship. Using contribution data from the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC) between 2006 and 2012 paired with endorsement tabulations in both a set of regression and matching analyses, I uncover evidence that endorsements increase individual contributions to the candidate over the course of the election cycle. The results underpin the value of endorsements to non-incumbent candidates as well as their utility for the endorsing groups wishing to influence House elections.

Habitual party donors represent an important revenue source for American political parties. What remains unclear is whether the party committees can also count on these donors to support the congressional candidates who represent the parties’ best chances for seat maximization. Utilizing structural equation modeling and contribution data from the 2006 to the 2012 election cycles, I find habitual party donors and certain new party donors respond to changes in party control of the House by providing more support to incumbents when their party is in the majority and more support to nonincumbents when their party is in the minority. Moreover, party donors are more likely to give to congressional candidates, especially those competing in priority races, than nonparty donors. Party donors additionally are revealed to be an important funding source for congressional candidates.

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