Although moral reasoning is able to account for some of the variability in moral behavior, much remains unexplained. Recently, a number of components of personality have been proposed as bridging the gap between moral reasoning and moral behavior. The present study investigates the role that identity integration (the extent to which one's moral values have become integrated into identity) and religious orientation (one's motivation for engaging in religious practice) play in moral functioning. A sample of 60 undergraduates was assessed on identity integration, religious orientation, moral reasoning, and self-reported altruism. We found positive correlations among moral reasoning, identity integration, intrinsic religious orientation, and self-reported altruism. A hierarchical regression analysis, however, revealed moral reasoning to be the only significant predictor of self-reported altruistic behavior. We discuss the relationship between moral reasoning and identity integration and the extent to which the intrinsic religious orientation scale may be a measure of identity integration in the religious domain.Although there is evidence to show some consistency between stage of moral reasoning and moral behavior (Blasi 1980;Jennings, Kilkenny, and Kohlberg 1983), the degree of consistency should not mask the fact that one can reason at a principled level and still remain immoral in behavior. Walker and Hennig (1997) refer to this as the "gappiness of moral life" and call for moral functioning to be viewed within the broader context of personality. A number of intermediaries have been proposed, including moral emotions (

I shall in this paper defend a universalizability thesis against certain objections. It will shortly be clear that the thesis defended is not the universalizability thesis as generally understood but something which differs crucially from it in that it claims no role whatsoever in ‘the definition of morality’. My title may therefore be misleading in this respect.

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Elizabeth Pybus complains about the 'horrid habit' of dichotomizing and sets out to 'dissolve' the traditional dichotomy between 'deontological' and 'teleological' theories of morality. The following two extracts will serve to summarize her position:. .. there cannot be a theory of morality which is either purely deontological or purely teleological. .. any adequate account of morality must. .. not only contain teleological and deontological features, but must also attempt to integrate these as different aspects of the same phenomenon (p. 20). The concept of obligation in a theory of morality cannot be fundamental in the sense of 'self-sufficient'. .. nor can the concepts of end, purpose or good. The concepts are interdependent (p. 21).